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Copwatching
Jocelyn Simonson*
This Article explores the phenomenon of organized
copwatching-groups of local residents who wear uniforms, carry
visible recording devices, patrol neighborhoods, and film police-
citizen interactions in an effort to hold police departments
accountable to the populations they police. The Article argues that
the practice of copwatching illustrates both the promise of
adversarialism as a form of civic engagement and the potential of
traditionally powerless populations to contribute to constitutional
norms governing police conduct. Organized copwatching serves a
unique function in the world of police accountability by giving these
populations a vehicle through which to have direct, real-time input
into policing decisions that affect their neighborhoods.
Many scholars recognize that a lack of public participation is a
barrier to true police accountability. When searching for solutions
these same scholars often focus on studying and perfecting
consensus-based methods of participation such as community
policing, and neglect the study of more adversarial, confrontational
forms of local participation in policing. By analyzing copwatching as
a form of public participation, this Article challenges the scholarly
focus on consensus-based strategies of police accountability. The
Article urges scholars and reformers to take adversarial, bottom-up
mechanisms of police accountability seriously-not just as protest,
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but as true participation. Doing so requires respecting observation
and contestation as legitimate civic gestures worthy ofprotection.
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This Valentine's Day: Love Your Community, Watch the Cops.'
INTRODUCTION
Since mid-2014, events in Ferguson, Staten Island, Baltimore, and around
the country have brought to the nation's attention the racial and spatial
differences in how people interact with the criminal justice system, especially
2with respect to policing. One cause of these differences is the gap between
criminal justice involvement and democratic opportunity: residents of
neighborhoods with large concentrations of poor people of color have the most
frequent contact with, but the least input into, local policing policies and
practices.3 A wide range of commentators-including President Obama-have
1. Valentine's Day E-Card from CopwatchNYC.org (Feb. 2014) (on file with author).
2. See, e.g., David A. Graham, Systemic Racism or Isolated Abuses? Americans Disagree,
ATLANTIC (May 7, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/systemic-racism-or-
isolated-abuse-americans-disagree/392570 [https://perma.cc/U2K6-32Q7] (describing a change in how
white Americans view policing between December 2014 and April 2015).
3. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 911, 915-18 (2006); Alexandra Natapoff, Deregulating Guilt: The Information Culture of the
Criminal System, 30 CARDoZO L. REV. 965,983-85 (2008).
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increasingly argued that expanding public participation in policing may help
mitigate the "simmering distrust ' 4 between police and communities.
This proposition has long preoccupied criminal justice scholars as well.
For decades, the dominant scholarly approach to increasing local participation
in policing has been to seek out collaboration and consensus between local
residents and police officers, most often through the set of practices known as
"community policing.",5 One central goal of community policing is for
communities and police departments to work together to decrease animosity
and increase legitimacy.6 The leading scholarly approach thus encourages
deliberation and consensus building between communities and the police, while
leaving direct, adversarial mechanisms of accountability, such as disciplinary
hearings, to the State. The result is that adversarial forms of community
participation are largely written out of the picture.
In this Article, I challenge the wisdom of this focus on consensus in
public participation by exploring the phenomenon of organized copwatching-
groups of local residents who wear uniforms, carry visible recording devices,
patrol neighborhoods, and film police-citizen interactions in an effort to hold
police departments accountable to the populations they police. Rather than seek
consensus with police officers, copwatching groups take an adversarial stance
toward the police: they point their cameras at officers, ask them questions
about the officers' practices and policies, and critique those practices and
policies on social media and in court. Organized copwatching is not a new
phenomenon. 7 But the practice is on the rise, particularly among poor
4. This is President Obama's phrase. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President
After Meeting with Elected Officials, Community and Faith Leaders, and Law Enforcement Officials
on How Communities and Law Enforcement Can Work Together to Build Trust and Strengthen
Neighborhoods Across the Country (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/12/01/remarks-president-after-meeting-elected-officials-community-and-faith-le
[http://perma.cc/4G5T-CYF7].
5. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 123, 125
(2008); James Forman, Jr., Community Policing and Youth as Assets, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1, 2-8 (2004); Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1626-31
(2002); Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 327-32 (1998).
6. See generally DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 86-97 (2008)
(describing this rising preoccupation with participation and legitimacy with respect to policing); see
also infra Part I. For example, Yale Law School Professor Tracey Meares, a member of the
President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, has argued that police departments should not only
listen to communities but should also help create communities. See Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop:
Knowing the Difference Between Lawful or Effective Policing and Righful Policing-And Why It
Matters, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1865, 1885 (2013) ("Policing should.., play a role in the
production of self-identity that helps to 'construct and sustain our "we-feeling"--our very felt sense of
"common publicness.""' (citing IAN LOADER & NEIL WALKER, CIVILIZING SECURITY 154 (2007)).
7. Indeed, organized copwatching has been a tactic of social movements since at least the
1960s. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. Moreover, as the availability and use of
smartphones has spread, individuals can and do spontaneously record police officers in public-an
informal, unorganized form of copwatching-with increasing frequency. See Seth F. Kreimer,
2016]
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populations of color seeking police accountability in their neighborhoods.8 This
is especially true after the rise of the #BlackLivesMatter movement9: the fall of
2014 saw the founding of new organized copwatching patrols in Ferguson,
Chicago, and New York City.'0 More followed in early 2015 in Cleveland,
Baltimore, Boston, and Charleston." Legal scholars, however, have not asked
whether and how copwatching should relate to larger analyses of community
participation in criminal justice.12
This Article brings organized copwatching into the scholarly conversation
around police accountability, and presents a critique of the prevailing notion of
community participation in policing that privileges consensus over conflict.
Two central claims stem from this critique.
My primary claim is that scholars and reformers should recognize that
promoting public participation in criminal justice must include facilitating the
ability of civilians to observe, record, and contest police practices and
constitutional norms. To seek only collaboration, at the expense of dissent, is to
miss out on an important piece of the puzzle that is popular police
accountability. In making this argument, I draw on the concept in democratic
theory of agonism-an adversarial but respectful stance toward institutions in
Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 335, 339-51 (2011).
8. Organized copwatching groups have proliferated over the last two decades, cropping up
throughout the United States. See infra Part I.A.
9. See Elizabeth Day, #BlackLivesMatter: The Birth of a New Civil Rights Movement,
GUARDIAN (July 19, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/19/blacklivesmatter-birth-
civil-rights-movement [https://perma.cc/L347-BVBV] (describing the growth of the
#BlackLivesMatter movement into a major political force).
10. See, e.g., Associated Press, Ferguson Residents Get Body Cameras to Record Police, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/22/ferguson-
residents-get-body-cameras-to-record-police [https://perma.cc/Z5NK-PQBR]; Ben Kochman,
Watchdog Groups Training Citizens to Join Copwatch Movement by Catching Rogue Police in Action,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/city-watchdog-
groups-training-citizens-film-rogue-cops-article- 1. 196003 1.
11. Owen Boss, 'Copwatch' Event Aims to Inform Citizens of Rights, BOS. HERALD (May 29,
2015), http://www.bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_coverage/2015/05/copwatch-eventaims
to informcitizens of rights [https://penna.cc/5BXA-3W9Z] (announcing Copwatch training);
Support, WECOPWATCH.ORG (describing groups in North Charleston, Cleveland, and Baltimore)
[https://perma.cc/XJ7M-2YGG]; see also Poh Si Teng & Ben Laffin, Copwatch vs. Cops: After
Freddie Gray, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/us/copwatch-vs-cops-
afler-freddie-gray.html ("Copwatch in the last year has started to grow and take on new forms.") (see
video accompanying article).
12. Although some First Amendment scholars have analyzed the right to film the police, legal
scholars have not explored how copwatching fits into larger discussions about police accountability
and community inclusion. For scholarship about the First Amendment right to film the police, see, for
example, Kreimer, supra note 7, at 339-51; Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell's Vision: Video and the
Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 649 (2009); cf Glenn Harlan Reynolds &
John A. Steakley, A Due Process Right to Record the Police, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2012)
(arguing for due process protection for citizens' right to record police).
[Vol. 104:391
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power'3-as a way to locate the normative good that comes from looking
beyond consensus when seeking public participation in criminal justice from
less powerful populations.
Second, I claim that organized copwatching demonstrates the potential of
politically powerless populations to contribute to constitutional norms
governing police conduct. While some scholars present individual
constitutional rights as separate from,14 or even in conflict with,15 community
interests in safety and public order, organized copwatchers call these
presumptions into question through rigorous engagement with Fourth
Amendment principles.' 6 Organized copwatchers articulate the communal
interests at stake in the constitutional regulation of the police. 17 Professor
Jerome Skolnick, in his seminal study of American police officers, noted that
"[a]s invokers of the criminal law, the police frequently act in practice as its
chief interpreter."' 8 Copwatchers aim to shift this calculus by infusing their
own views of what is "reasonable" or fair into everyday interactions with
police officers in their neighborhoods. If Fourth Amendment reasonableness is
an "immense Rorschach blot" with officers and judges as its analysts,' 9 then
copwatchers provide an alternative interpretation from the point of view of the
citizen interacting with the officer.
13. See generally CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS: THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY 1-
19 (2013).
14. See, e.g., Forman, Jr., supra note 5, at 15-16 (arguing that community policing holds more
promise for improving policing practices than does Fourth Amendment enforcement through conrs);
Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 768-81 (2012) (describing the
limits of the Constitution in regulating police conduct).
15. See, e.g., TRACEY L. MEARES & DAN M. KAHAN, When Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox
of Unwanted Rights, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 3, 4-5
(Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999) (arguing that there is a conflict between democratic rule and
individual rights with respect to the policing of minority communities); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 52-74 (1997).
16. Although scholars are correct to highlight the shortcomings of the Fourth Amendment in
holding police accountable for individual instances of wrongdoing, my claim here is that they are too
quick to turn away from on-the-ground popular engagement with the Fourth Amendment by
disempowered populations as itself a form of lay participation in criminal justice. For critiques of the
efficacy of the Fourth Amendment, see generally I. Bennett Capers, The Fourth Problem, 49 TULSA L.
REV. 431, 431 (2013) (reviewing STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2012) and TRACEY MACLN, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S EXCLUSIONARY RULE (2013)) ('These days, to say there is
a problem with the Fourth Amendment, the 'most litigated constitutional provision in the nation's
courts,' is to pretty much restate the obvious." (internal citation omitted)); William J. Stuntz, The
Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 833 (2006) ("The law of policing
might work reasonably well-better than the current system-without any constitutional regulation.").
17. This articulation is itself a form of demosprudence, members of social movements
engaging with constitutional principles. See Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind- Notes
Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2757-68 (2014).
18. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 14 (1966).
19. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
393-94 (1974).
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The existence of organized copwatching thus challenges the well-
entrenched scholarly dichotomy between community participation in policing
and state-driven accountability of police officers. There are ways other than
copwatching to document police behavior-for example, by requiring officers
to wear lapel or body cameras, a practice hailed of late by scholars, politicians,
and activists alike.20 But organized copwatching is different in kind than
police-worn cameras because it combines public participation and
accountability in one practice. Local residents become the subjects, rather than
the objects, of policing: civilians set the terms of engagement by deciding when
and where to record, which recordings to save, who can have access to the
footage, and how to frame the narratives surrounding the release of any
recordings.21 Traditionally powerless populations are able to have direct input
into discretionary policing decisions and constitutional norms in the context of
a criminal justice system that largely excludes those populations from learning
about its inner workings.
My claim is not that copwatching is an easy fix to the longstanding
problem of police accountability to populations living in areas with a high
police presence. To the contrary, organized copwatching groups do not
66 22represent" any larger public other than themselves, and their presence may at
times exacerbate existing tensions between police officers and neighborhood
23
residents. But at a time when the nation is refocusing on the longstanding
disconnect between the police and the populations they police, it is more
important than ever to make sure that we know what we mean when we speak
20. See generally Clare Sestanovich, Our Body-Cams, Ourselves, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb.
10, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/02/10/our-body-cams-ourselves
[http://perma.cc/PS9F-TP4X] (describing "broad (and rare) consensus ... in support of [body-cameras
by] advocates, legislators, and even many officers themselves"); Howard M. Wasserman, Moral
Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REv. 831, 832-33 (2015) (describing the widespread
support for police-worn body cameras expressed in 2014 by scholars, public officials, journalists,
activists, and police departments). Since mid-2014, at least thirteen states have considered legislation
mandating police to wear body cameras, and President Obama has proposed a three-year, $263 million
investment in body cameras. See Reid Wilson, Police Accountability Measures Flood State
Legislatures After Ferguson, Staten Island, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/02/04/police-accountability-measures-flood-
state-legislatures-after-ferguson-staten-island/ [http://perma.cciXY95-PPD9]. However, most major
American cities still do not have body cameras on their officers. See Dana Liebelson & Nick Wing,
Most Major Cities Still Don't Have Body Cameras for Cops, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/enty/police-body-cameras_55cbaac7e4b0fl cbfl e740f9?kv
[https://perma.cc/9LWE-XPGV].
21. For an extended comparison of police-wom body cameras and civilian recordings of
officers, see Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record the
Police, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 5-9).
22. Cf LAURA 1. APPLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY AND THE
CONSTITUTION 70-91 (2015) (discussing the difficulties with defining community in relation to
criminal justice); Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of "Community, " 2003 UTAH
L. REv. 343.
23. I discuss this and other potential pitfalls of the practice in Parts III & IV, infra.
[Vol. 104:391
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of participation, civic engagement, and repairing fractured relationships
between communities and the police.
This Article is the second in a series in which I present a conception of
public participation in criminal justice that includes observation and
contestation alongside traditional notions of participation through
deliberation. 24 The phenomenon of organized copwatching demonstrates that
the meaningful observation of the criminal justice system cannot be separated
from the ability of disempowered populations to provide meaningful input into
the workings of that system. This insight has consequences for criminal justice
more broadly: if we truly want to make our criminal justice system
democratically accountable, we must accept feedback not just through formal
state-structured mechanisms but also through means of feedback and
accountability that are designed by the people.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the current scholarly
focus on consensus in addressing the elusive nature of police accountability to
traditionally disempowered populations, especially African Americans and
Latinos. In Part II, I detail the practice of organized copwatching and its rise
over the last two decades. Using the results of interviews that I conducted with
representatives of eighteen copwatching organizations from around the United
States, I analyze the practice of organized copwatching as a form of police
accountability. In particular, I describe the ways in which copwatching deters
police misconduct, contributes to the collection of public information about
policing, and gives residents of policed neighborhoods input into defining the
contours of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
Part III takes on the serious challenge of police resistance to copwatching
and recognizes the limits of copwatching as a tactic of police accountability.
Part IV then uses the practice of organized copwatching to challenge the
consensus-based focus of scholars interested in public participation in criminal
justice. Part V then examines the normative commitments that flow from a
recognition of the ways in which copwatching functions as a form of police
accountability. For municipalities and police departments, this means
promoting a climate of respect for local groups that engage in the practice of
copwatching and its related activities. For the Department of Justice, local and
federal policing taskforces, and actors involved in structural reform litigation,
this means pushing for requirements that police departments train officers
regarding the First Amendment right to observe and record, including why
respect for such observation is important. Scholars and policy makers must
recognize that participation and cooperation do not always go hand in hand,
24. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARv. L.
REv. 2173, 2175 (2014). In the first Article, I argued that the power of observation by audience
members in criminal courtrooms can play an important role in promoting the accountability of public
actors--especially judges and district attorneys-in the criminal justice system. d. at 2177-200.
20161
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and that some forms of adversarial participation are worthy of our respect and
protection.
I.
COMMUNITY AND CONSENSUS IN POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY
Police departments tend to be unpopular among the residents of areas in
which the bulk of police stops, frisks, and arrests take place: neighborhoods
with large concentrations of poor people, especially poor people of color.
These residents feel that police officers are simultaneously underprotecting and
overpolicing their neighborhoods. 6 In particular, the vast majority of African
Americans consider violence against civilians by police officers to be a serious
problem.27 This distrust between people living in neighborhoods with a large
police presence and the police departments in those neighborhoods is a
problem for democratic accountability, 28  legitimacy, 29  and fairness.
30
Moreover, this distance between the police and "communities" 31 is a symptom
25. See, e.g., Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 677
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 1034), at *3 [hereinafter Fagan Report] (finding that in New York City
stops and frisks are concentrated in areas with a high percentage of Black and Hispanic residents). See
generally Robert J. Sampson & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance
of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 777 (1998)
(finding that dissatisfaction with police is highest in disadvantaged neighborhoods and among
minority populations); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 1009 (1999) ("[T]he history of antagonistic relations between the
police and individuals of color has fostered general uneasiness among people of color about contact
with police officers.").
26. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HuO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 162-64 (2002); Ronald Weitzer, Race and Policing in
Different Ecological Contexts, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS
118, 121 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010) (describing this combination of
"depolicing and harsh policing").
27. See New Survey on Americans' Views on Law Enforcement, Violence, and Race, NORC,
U. CHI. (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.norc.org/NewsEventsPublications/PressReleases/Pages/new-
survey-on-americans-views-on-law-enforcement-violence-and-race.aspx [https://perma.cc/32BB-
MVH6] (finding that three-quarters of black respondents consider violence against civilians by police
officers to be an extremely or very serious problem).
28. See TRACI BURCH, TRADING DEMOCRACY FOR JUSTICE: CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS AND
THE DECLINE OF NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 75-104 (2013) (describing how
residents of "high-imprisonment" neighborhood lack political power and democratic accountability).
See generally Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827
(2015) (stressing the importance of governing police discretion through processes of democratic
accountability).
29. See Tom R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young
Urban Men's Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 751-55, 771 (2014) (collecting
studies that demonstrate the loss of legitimacy of police officers in the eyes of young men of color).
30. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1331-37 (2012)
(describing the phenomenon of misdemeanor arrests without adequate evidence in "high-volume, low-
scrutiny" situations such as those found in zero-tolerance policing and routine urban street control).
31. I put the word community in quotations because it is a notoriously vague concept; people
mean different things when they use it. See STEVE HERBERT, CITIZENS, COPS, AND POWER:
RECOGNIZING THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY 55, 72-89 (2006) (describing how police departments
[Vol. 104:391
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of the larger decline in political power of neighborhoods in which arrests and
prosecutions are concentrated.3 2
How, then, should we approach this ever-widening gap between police
departments and the poor, minority populations that they police? Scholars and
policy makers concerned with this phenomenon tend to focus on creating
consensus-based mechanisms of inclusion for disempowered populations.
Although these mechanisms differ substantially, they all center on police
departments seeking ongoing input from and deliberation with residents and
other stakeholders. As I detail below, this includes both "community policing"
at the neighborhood level and efforts to bring the approach of new governance,
specifically "democratic experimentalism," to the structural reform of entire
police departments. These approaches recognize the limits of traditional
political and legal channels to hold police accountable to local communities. At
the same time, they represent a turn away from the focus on regulating
constitutional violations against individual officers.
Indeed, these consensus-based strategies may be based, in part, on a sense
that two traditionally adversarial dimensions of accountability-civilian
review 33 and Fourth Amendment enforcement-have failed to hold police
define "community" in different terms than residents of policed neighborhoods); Albert W. Alschuler
& Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors
Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 216-17 (critiquing the amorphous concept of
community in the context of policing); Regina Austin, "The Black Community, "Its Lawbreakers, and
a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1770-74 (1992) (describing different conceptions
of "community" among African Americans with respect to criminal justice); Mary I. Coombs, The
Constricted Meaning of "Community" in Community Policing, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1367, 1372
(1998) (noting that, in the context of community policing models, "[tlhe communities that suffer from
under[]enforcement and overfenforcement aren't exactly the same community, even when they can
each be described as 'minority communities'); Weisberg, supra note 22, at 347 (critiquing the
concept of community in the rise of restorative justice). But because it is the word that many scholars
and even more policy makers use, I use it here as a proxy for the idea of people who reside in a
particular neighborhood and have a common stake in the policing of that neighborhood.
32. See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 34 (2012) ("Residents of
high-crime neighborhoods have some personal concerns and knowledge [of the criminal justice
system], but may be politically powerless and poor."); BURCH, supra note 28, at 75-104 (describing
lack of political power of poor populations of color from which the majority of prison populations
come); AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIp: THE DEMOCRATIC
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 199-231 (2014) (describing alienation and
withdrawal from political life of individuals who had contact with the criminal justice system via
stops, arrests, or confinement); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 63-120, 216-18 (2011) (describing a historical trajectory in which democratic participation
dies out for African American communities affected by both crime and the criminal justice system);
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1291-98 (2004) (describing how mass incarceration in African
American communities erodes those communities' ability to cultivate political power and affect the
system).
33. See generally SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 144
(2005) ("To date, however, there is no evidence that civilian review boards are effective in achieving
their stated goals."); Stephen Clarke, Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Analysis and Case Study of
How Civilian Oversight of the Police Should Function and How it Fails, 43 COLuM. J.L. & SOc.
2016]
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accountable to local residents. The Fourth Amendment's enforcement
mechanisms are notoriously weak, both in their ability to deter misconduct and
in their ability to hold officers accountable for misconduct.34 This stems, in
part, from the Fourth Amendment's vague standards of "reasonableness,"
which leave courts room to interpret those standards in favor of police
officers35 and give officers a monopoly over the narratives that shape courts'
interpretations. 36  Moreover, as courts currently interpret the Fourth
Amendment, much police behavior is discretionary and occurs outside the
bounds of the Amendment's restrictions. 37 In particular, police officers can
detain or arrest someone with probable cause for any criminal infraction, no
matter how minor 38 The Fourth Amendment, in other words, has seemingly
nothing to say about how police departments decide what types of arrests to
make and in which neighborhoods to make them.39 This issue is of particular
concern for many poor people of color in areas that engage in order-
maintenance policing and other place-based initiatives.40 It is in the context of
these limits of the Fourth Amendment that community policing, democratic
experimentalism, and other consensus-based initiatives have come to the
forefront of police accountability scholarship and policy making.
PROBS. 1, 2-12 (2009); Hector Soto, The Failure of Civilian Oversight, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Oct. 9,
2007), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/open-govenment/3683-the-failure-of-civilian-
oversight [https://perma.cc/9RCH-4U29].
34. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1609, 1618-36 (2012) (documenting the "illusory deterrence" of traditional sanctions for Fourth
Amendment misconduct); Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA.
L. REV. 687, 689 (2011) ("[T]he substantively living protections of the Fourth Amendment are being
procedurally killed-it is a death by a thousand procedural cuts.").
35. See David N. Dorfinan, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L.
455, 472-73 (1999) (describing a "grey zone of morality" that police inhabit and judges accept when
litigating Fourth Amendment claims); see also infra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
36. See SKOLNICK, supra note 18, at 12; see also infra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
37. See Harmon, supra note 14, at 768-81; Meares, supra note 6, at 1869; see also infra notes
186-87 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996).
39. See Susan A. Bandes, The Challenges of "Quality of Life" Policing for the Fourth
Amendment, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 45, 45
(John T. Parry & L. Song Richardson eds., 2013); Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional
Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a "Pointless Indignity," 66 STAN. L. REv. 987, 992-
95 (2014); Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1179-81
(2012).
40. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING 90-121 (2001) (describing effects of order-maintenance policing on populations
in which arrests take place); Bandes, supra note 39, at 46-48 (describing how quality-of-life policing
affects entire neighborhoods but is not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny); Josh Bowers & Paul
H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of
Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 229-31 (2012) (describing how
residents of high crime areas may not think as highly of order-maintenance policing as the general
public); Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing The Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REv. 946, 952 (2002)
(describing psychological effects on African Americans of their subjection to constant police scrutiny).
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It is difficult to overstate the influence of the concept of community
policing. In the United States it has been the most widely acclaimed and
heavily funded policing strategy over the last three decades. 4' In the months
following events in Ferguson and Staten Island in 2014, community policing
was the go-to concept for politicians and reformers. Responding to the grand
jury decision in Ferguson in December 2014, for example, President Obama
explicitly vowed to use the resources of the federal government to "strengthen
community policing. ' '42 The President then created a Task Force whose mission
was to "identify the best means to provide an effective partnership between law
enforcement and local communities." 43  The Task Force's eventual
recommendations included a panoply of consensus-based strategies to improve
police-community relationships, including "collaborat[ion] with community
members to develop policies and strategies.
' 44
Although community policing is a vague term,45 it often refers to efforts
to include local residents in regular collaborative meetings to solicit input on
policing priorities.46 Community policing initiatives vary in how they try to
41. See generally Forman, Jr., supra note 5, at 1; Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the
Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv.
551, 575 (1997); Meares, supra note 5, at 1600; Wesley G. Skogan & Jeffrey A. Roth, Introduction to
COMMUNITY POLICING: CAN IT WORK? xvii, xvii (Wesley G. Skogan ed., 2004) ("Community
policing is the most important development in policing in the past quarter century.").
42. See David Hudson, Building Trust Between Communities and Local Police,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/12/01/building-tmst-
between-communities-and-local-police [http://perma.cc/3YR3-JZ48].
43. Establishment of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Exec. Order No.
13684, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,865, 76,865 (Dec. 18, 2014).
44. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 20 (May 2015),
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforcefinalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W26-QN5R].
Nowhere in the one-hundred-page report does the Task Force mention civilian filming of police or
recommend that police departments respect civilian filming. See id
45. Cf OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY
POLICING DEFINED 3 (2014), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/vets-to-cops/e030917193-CP-
Defmed.pdf [http://perma.cc/WER2-GMR9] The Department of Justice gives the following definition
of the term: "[A] philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of
partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give
rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime." Id. "Community
policing" can refer to a variety of different approaches to policing. See generally SKLANSKY, supra
note 6, at 82 (describing community policing as a "unifying rhetoric," "notorious for meaning different
things to different people"); Michael D. Reisig, Community and Problem-Oriented Policing, 39
CRIME & JUST. 1, 2-40 (2010) (describing the evolution of community policing over three decades).
Police officials have also used the term "community policing" to refer to order-maintenance policing
and other policies of mass misdemeanor arrests, but many of those policies do not seek out
community-police partnerships. See HARCOURT, supra note 40, at 47.
46. See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN
DEMOCRACY 56-68 (2004) (laying out the ideal of participatory deliberation in community policing
using Chicago as a model); Doff & Sabel, supra note 5, at 327-32 (describing the promise of
community policing efforts in Chicago in the mid-1990s to include residents in formulating policing
strategies at "beat meetings"); Matthew J. Parlow, The Great Recession and Its Implications for
Community Policing, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (2012) (defining community policing as "a
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include "community" members in police work. These initiatives can include
education through community meetings, placing community representatives on
advisory councils, and enlisting the help of residents in crime detection and
47prevention.
Scholars who promote community policing often focus on the benefits of
deliberative and collaborative decision making. They argue that having a voice
in a deliberative process both improves substantive outcomes and increases
residents' satisfaction with the policing priorities that emerge from the
deliberation. 48 This satisfaction, in turn, promotes legitimacy and makes
residents more likely to work with police officers in identifying and fighting
crime. 49 Over the last several decades, community policing has led to a number
of successes in improving police-community relationships and perhaps in
reducing crime as well. 50 Although I do not recount these successes here, it is
clear that in addition to reducing crime in some places, many community
policing initiatives have changed essential aspects of how police officers view
some neighborhood's residents and vice versa.
But there are limits to the community policing approach. For instance,
some scholars have highlighted the tendency of community policing efforts to
exclude the most marginalized and disadvantaged people in their meetings and
interactions with "stakeholders." 51 This is of particular concern because these
theoretical and practical approach to policing that focuses on crime prevention, order maintenance, and
partnership with the community to achieve these goals").
47. See generally JAMES FOREMAN [sic], JR., FIVE POLICE DEPARTMENTS BUILDING TRUST
AND COLLABORATION: INNOVATIONS IN POLICING CLINIC, YALE LAW SCHOOL (2013),
http://www.bjaexecutivesessiononpoliceleadership.org/pdfs/006FivePDCaseStudiesExecSum.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q59C-NGBZ] [hereinafter YALE INNOVATIONS IN POLICING REPORT] (describing
specific examples of each of these approaches); Wesley G. Skogan, Representing the Community in
Community Policing, in COMMUNITY POLICING: Can It Work?, supra note 41, at 57 (describing four
forms of community involvement in community policing: education, assistance, coproduction of
safety, and representation on advisory boards).
48. See, e.g., Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empowered Deliberation in
Chicago Schools and Policing, 29 POL. & SOC'Y 73, 73-80 (2001) (discussing how community
policing in Chicago exemplifies "Empowered Deliberative Democracy"); Erik Luna, Race, Crime,
and Institutional Design, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183, 204-08 (2003) (citing JORGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMs: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996)) (discussing how police departments can use the ideas of
deliberative democracy and procedural justice to increase citizen participation).
49. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 26, at 198-203.
50. See Reisig, supra note 45, at 23-43 (collecting studies showing that "the weight of the
evidence suggests that community and problem-solving policing tactics can reduce crime, albeit
modestly, and improve citizens' perceptions of neighborhood conditions").
51. See, e.g, HERBERT, supra note 31, at 55-59 (describing how in Seattle's community
policing program, the same three to five people "represented" the "community" in community
meetings); Forman, Jr., supra note 5, at 14-16, 19-21 (describing and collecting studies of the uneven
inclusion of populations with little political power in community policing, especially poor people of
color, and describing how youth have, for the most part, been left out of community policing efforts);
Skogan, supra note 47, at 73 (describing how attendance at beat meetings in Chicago represents "a
strong middle-class bias" and "do[es]a better job at representing already established stakeholders in the
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marginalized populations are often also those with the most frequent
interactions with police officers on a day-to-day basis.52 Other scholars have
raised the worry that community policing may co-opt community concerns
rather than represent them; police may be "buying peace" rather than earning
it.53 And despite its name, community policing efforts remain in the control of
the police, driven by the police department's terms, schedule, and outlook.54
Scholars and reformers who recognize these problems have largely responded
by doubling down on the central tenets of community policing by trying to
create more opportunities for public input into policing practices 55 and
community than [it] do[es] at integrating marginalized groups with fewer mechanisms for voicing their
concerns").
52. See Forman, Jr., supra note 5, at 16-17 (describing how police are mobilized at higher
rates in communities of color and therefore interact with minority youth more frequently than with
white youth); Fagan Report, supra note 25 (finding higher rates of stops and frisks among police
precincts in New York City with larger percentages of Black and Hispanic residents); cf Amna Akbar,
National Security's Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834, 838-39 (2015) (arguing that
"community policing brings new law enforcement scrutiny to an already marginalized community").
53. Cf Skogan, supra note 47, at 57 ("One reason-perhaps the major one-cities adopt
community policing is to solve their legitimacy problems and buy peace in poor and disenfranchised
neighborhoods."). For discussions of co-optation, see also HERBERT, supra note 31, at 72-73 (finding
that police constitute their own view of community and "recognize some and not other forms of input
as legitimate"); Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 31, at 217 ("Far from serving the needs of the
disadvantaged, the concept of community can, in the wrong hands, become another weapon for
perpetuating the disempowerment and discrimination that continue to haunt urban America."); Bowers
& Robinson, supra note 40, at 246 ("[T]he legitimacy project for its part does not actually demand that
procedures be fair, only that they appear to be."); Stephen D. Mastrofski & Jack R. Greene,
Community Policing and the Rule of Law, in POLICE INNOVATION AND CONTROL OF THE POLICE:
PROBLEMS OF LAW, ORDER, AND COMMUNITY 80, 92-93 (David Weisburd & Craig Uchida eds.,
1993) (discussing "the challenge of stimulating actual community voice rather than achieving co-
optation"); M. Alexander Pearl, Of "Texans" and "Custers ": Maximizing Welfare and Efficiency
Through Informal Norms, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 32, 47-48 (2014) (arguing that community
policing imposes norms on the community that are "fundamentally external and foreign to the
community," even if they are "executed by various members of the community").
54. See SKLANSKY, supra note 6, at 83 ("The theme is community partnership, not
community control: with minor exceptions, community policing programs are implemented
unilaterally by the police.").
55. See, e.g., BIBAS, supra note 32, at 144-56 (proposing greater transparency and
participation in policing through community policing strategies that include both physical meetings
and electronic sources of information and feedback); Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas,
Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1, 37-53 (2012); Erik Luna, Transparent
Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1168-70 (2000). In 2013, for example, Mayor Rahm Emanuel
revamped the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) community policing program in Chicago
based on contentions that CAPS had become too far removed from the community. See Natalie
Moore, Chicago Revamps Community Policing Program, WBEZ CHI. (Jan. 8, 2013),
http://blogs.luc.edu/mediacips/files/2013/0l/The-BEZChicago-revamps-community-policing-
program_01.08.13.pdf [https://perma.cc/932G-GCV4]. These changes, however, have led to echoes of
old criticisms from community members. One local community organization, for instance, released a
report criticizing CAPS as "the superficial involvement of select community members in providing
police with legitimacy." See WE CHARGE GENOCIDE, COUNTER-CAPS REPORT: THE COMMUNITY
ENGAGEMENT ARM OF THE POLICE STATE 3 (Oct. 2015), http://wechargegenocide.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/CAPSreport-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RTQ-4PSQ].
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emphasizing the need to reach out to "unlikely allies" in police-citizen
partnerships.56
More recently, scholars, courts, and police departments have begun to
channel the consensus-based ideals of community policing and "democratic
experimentalism" 57 toward encouraging ongoing collaboration between the
Department of Justice, local community groups, and entire police
departments.5 8 This has meant combining the federal power of the Department
of Justice's ability to sue municipalities under section 1414 159 with efforts to
include stakeholders in ongoing participation in structural reform litigation. In
particular, scholars hail Cincinnati as a promising example. In Cincinnati, the
police department signed not only a consent decree with the Department of
Justice but also a Collaborative Agreement with the ACLU, the Cincinnati
Black Front, and the local police union, requiring the department to solicit
ongoing input from stakeholders as the department worked to reduce excessive
force.6  Democratic experimentalism places a premium on the potential of
deliberation among local stakeholders to result in both better policing and
policing that residents perceive as more legitimate; as with community
56. See, e.g., Forman, Jr., supra note 5, at 29-41 (advocating that community policing
initiatives focus on youth); YALE INNOVATIONS IN POLICING REPORT, supra note 47, at 4-5
(describing efforts in Philadelphia, Charlotte, High Point, and Seattle to reach "unlikely allies").
57. Doff & Sabel, supra note 5, at 267 (defining democratic experimentalism as a system in
which "power is decentralized to enable citizens and other actors to utilize their local knowledge to fit
solutions to their individual circumstances" but local lessons are shared regionally and nationally); see
also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 345-47 (2004) (describing the host of terms
used in legal scholarship to describe the shift from regulation to governance).
58. See, e.g., Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
41, 101-05 (2001); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1047 (2004) (describing how community groups have
litigated to achieve greater collaboration with the Justice Department); Kami Chavis Simmons, New
Governance and the "New Paradigm" of Police Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police
Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 389-419 (2010).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012); see Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through
Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009); Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the
Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 819-20 (1999); see
also Michael D. White, Preventing Racially Biased Policing Through Internal and External Controls:
The Comprehensive Accountability Package, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND
ESSENTIAL READINGS 468,477-79 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010).
60. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Jay
Rothman, Identity and Conflict: Collaboratively Addressing Police-Community Conflict in Cincinnati,
Ohio, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 105,105-09 (2006); Simmons, supra note 58, at 423-25; Elliot
Harvey Schatmeier, Note, Reforming Police Use-of-Force Practices: A Case Study of the Cincinnati
Police Department, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 539, 556-63 (2013).
61. See Collaborative Agreement, In re Cincinnati Policing, No. C-1 -99-317 (S.D. Ohio April
12, 2002), http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/linkservid/27A205F1-69E9-4446-
BC18BDI46CB73DF2/showMeta/0/ [http://perma.cc/CEU6-887C]; SAUL A. GREEN ET AL., CITY OF
CINCINNATI INDEPENDENT MONITOR'S FINAL REPORT 36-51 (2008), http://www.cincinnati-
oh.gov/police/linkservid/97D9709F-FIC1-4A75-804C07D9873DC70F/showMeta/0/
[https://penna.cc/Y7Y2-TPLX].
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policing, the process of consensus-driven deliberation is itself part of the
62point.
And as with community policing, depending on stakeholder participation
as a proxy for "community" involvement raises concerns about both who is
included as representatives of the "community" and the extent to which the
input of those representatives is taken seriously.63 For instance, some scholars
have critiqued consent decrees between the Department of Justice and police
departments that do not require ongoing and meaningful inclusion of affected
community groups in their monitoring. 64 More broadly, scholars of new
governance have recognized that there is a danger that decentralized
participation of this nature can become "cosmetic" or even re-inscribe existing
power imbalances.6 5 As with community policing, though, the scholarly
solution is often to improve upon the inclusion of community groups in
structural reform rather than to look beyond consensus-driven approaches.
66
Not all legal scholars seek out consensus-based processes for public
participation. Professor David Sklansky, for instance, has been a prominent
critic of the focus on legitimacy and participation in policing, demonstrating
62. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 58, at 133 ("[Wlhen the emphasis is on partnerships,
aggressive and quasi-militaristic attitudes that risk alienating significant segments of the community
are counterproductive." (quoting Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms
Approach to Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L.
REv. 1253, 1267-68 (2000))); Simmons, supra note 58, at 409 ("The opportunity for police officers
and community members to deliberate about police conduct and police-citizen interactions is key to
dismantling the 'us versus them' mentality."). The ultimate success of these reforms remains a matter
of debate. See generally Simone Weichselbaum, Cincinnati: Ferguson 's Hope or Hype?, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Nov. 25, 2014), https:/Iwww.themarshallproject.org/2014/11/25/cincinnati-ferguson-s-hope-
or-hype [https://perma.cc/KWQ9-LQDV].
63. Cf An Open Letter to the ACLU of Illinois Regarding Stop & Frisk, WE CHARGE
GENOCIDE (Aug. 12, 2015), http://wechargegenocide.org/an-open-letter-to-the-aclu-of-illinois-
regarding-stop-frisk/ [https://perma.ccN78Z-DT8C] (laying out a community group's dissatisfaction
with settlement negotiations between the ACLU of Illinois, the City of Chicago, and the Chicago
Police Department).
64. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 58, at 101-05 (describing how consent decrees fail to include
local residents); Sabel & Simon, supra note 58, at 1047 (describing the importance of the role of
citizen groups in consent decrees between police departments and the Department of Justice);
Simmons, supra note 58, at 419.
65. Jaime Alison Lee, "Can You Hear Me Now? ": Making Participatory Governance Work
for the Poor, 7 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 405, 413-17 (2013) (describing problem of "cosmetic
participation" in New Governance initiatives); see also Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance
Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 362 (2009) ("[P]articipatory structures may rhetorically include
disempowered stakeholders but actually cede little or no power.").
66. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 33, at 187 (discussing the need for police departments to
engage community representatives in their plans to design accountability systems); Garrett, supra note
58, at 101-05 (describing problems with many consent decrees and arguing that "[b]uilding remedies
with outside groups as 'equal partners' can solve many of the problems these decrees have
encountered"); Lee, supra note 65, at 406; Sabel & Simon, supra note 58, at 1047; Simmons, supra
note 58, at 419 ('The DOJ should actively identify additional stakeholders in the jurisdictions affected
by its Pattern or Practice legislation and invite them to participate in developing and considering the
reforms.").
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powerfully the link between conceptions of democracy and conceptions of
policing: as democratic theory has moved away from pluralism to focus on
deliberation, so too have ideas about policing moved toward a focus on
consensus, often at the expense of considering disempowered voices and the
67political dynamics that disempower them. Generally, though, scholars who
seek to increase local public participation in policing, and especially those
concerned with disempowered minority populations, look toward designing
and perfecting deliberative, consensus-based mechanisms of inclusion. These
mechanisms focus not on enforcing individual constitutional rights but rather
on guiding discretionary policies and practices made possible by broad
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.68
This focus on consensus and deliberation--on getting a seat at the table-
misses out on a number of possibilities. It does not engage with the potential
for social movements aimed at changing police practices to be a part of legal
changes and even formal regulatory mechanisms. 69 It does not recognize the
resonance that individual rights have for disenfranchised groups, even those
groups who simultaneously recognize the limits of those rights. 70 And it does
not adequately address the dangers of co-optation and legitimation when
certain voices are shut out of the process. 71 Perfecting consensus overlooks the
civic participation that the people who do not make it to the table engage in
when they become frustrated with police policies and behavior in their
67. See SKLANSKY, supra note 6, at 13-74. Nor do all scholars turn away from constitutional
rights in thinking about public participation; some scholars have advocated that juries decide questions
of Fourth Amendment reasonableness that are usually removed from larger societal norms of what is
reasonable. See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Katz Jury, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 839, 840 (2008); Meghan J.
Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution, 65 ALA. L. REV. 849, 891-94 (2014).
68. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); see also infra Part H.D (discussing Fourth Amendment reasonableness and police discretion).
69. Cf Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution:
The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 28 (2005) (discussing how social
movements can change constitutional law by moving the boundaries of what is plausible); Guinier &
Torres, supra note 17, at 2750-69; Michael W. McCann, How Does Law Matter for Social
Movements?, in HOW DOES LAW MATTER? 76, 90-100 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998)
(describing the ways that social movements interact with formal laws); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional
Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006) (arguing that "constitutional culture channels social movement conflict to
produce enforceable constitutional understandings"). But see WALKER, supra note 33, at 178-80
(noting the role of community groups in changing police practices).
70. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 83-84 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the myth of rights); George I. Lovell, The Myth
of the Myth of Rights, 59 STUD. L., POL., & SOC'Y 1, 3-7 (2012); cf Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw,
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1368 (1988) (discussing the use of legal rights ideology in the civil rights
movement).
71. See MOUFFE, AGONISTICS, supra note 13, at 1-19 (laying out a theoretical critique of the
legitimating functions of participatory democracy); IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 148 (2003) ("[D]eiberative processes can be manipulated by people with ulterior motives,
they can marginalize the inarticulate (who may well also be those most vulnerable to domination), and
they can result in stonewalling by the powerful in the face of needed changes."); see also infra Part IV.
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neighborhoods. Not everyone who dislikes the police withdraws from civic life,
or worse, turns to crime; instead, many turn to forms of civil engagement
outside of state-driven mechanisms. Organized copwatching is an example of
such civic engagement: when groups of lay people come together to contest
police practices through observation, recording, and dialogue, they engage in a
civic gesture worthy of respect and protection.
II.
COPWATCHING AS POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY
This Part details the practice of organized copwatching and its rise over
the last two decades. As I will show, organized copwatching gives traditionally
powerless populations a way to have direct input into policing decisions that
affect their neighborhoods. The "voice" of local residents comes out both in the
moment, when the real-time observation of police officers deters
unconstitutional conduct and promotes positive interactions, and after the fact,
when copwatch members contribute to the accountability of police departments
through both formal institutions and the informal public sphere. As
copwatchers deter misconduct and enforce the Fourth Amendment, they also
inject their own views about what the Fourth Amendment can or should be. At
the same time, copwatching reveals the limits of the Fourth Amendment,
asking that police officers think about more than if their conduct would pass
eventual inspection at a suppression hearing.
First, I present the basics of the practice of copwatching and, in particular,
some distinctions between casual filming of the police and organized
copwatching. I base my account of organized copwatching on telephone
interviews I conducted in early 2014 with representatives of eighteen
copwatching groups from across the country. The purpose of the interviews
was not to collect a full empirical data set that catalogues the practice of
copwatching but rather to collect examples of the practice that go beyond
second-hand accounts found in the popular media. The interviews thus serve as
a source of anecdote to flesh out a thick description of a prevalent civic
practice. I hope that unearthing the ever-growing practice of copwatching
might inspire social scientists to conduct more rigorous studies of the effects of
copwatching on individual police conduct, judicial decision making, and
structural police reform, a project that would require speaking not only with
copwatching groups but also with police officers, judges, and reformers. In this
Part, my goal is more modest: to describe a practice using the results of
interviews with representatives of copwatching organizations from around the
country. 
72
72. With the help of a research assistant, I conducted these semistructured interviews by
telephone in early 2014 with representatives from eighteen community organizations that engage in
copwatching as one of their central activities. The list of organizations, locations, and years that they
began copwatching is listed in Appendix A. Many copwatching groups did not want to participate in
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A. The Tactic of Organized Copwatching
Copwatching-in the way that I am using the term--does not simply refer
to the spontaneous recording of police officers in public by civilians but rather
to organized groups of local residents who patrol their neighborhoods, monitor
police conduct, and create videos of what they see. Individual, spontaneous
recordings of police officers can of course have a big, real-world impact-from
the spontaneous video recordings of the beating of Rodney King in 1991 73 to
more recent smartphone recordings of the killings of Eric Garner in New York
City in 201474 and Walter Scott in South Carolina in 2015, 75 individual
recordings have a history of sparking outrage and dialogue about police
practices throughout the nation. Today, given the widespread use of
smartphones, civilian recording of police officers is ubiquitous. Professor Seth
Kreimer termed this phenomenon "pervasive image capture" and argued that
ubiquitous videotaping, especially of public officials, has the potential to
enhance public discourse and accountability.
76
Organized copwatching, though, does more than capture video. Indeed, as
a tactic of police accountability, copwatching predates smartphone technology
and even predates handheld video recording devices. Organized copwatching
groups emerged as early as the 1960s in urban areas in the United States when
the Black Panthers famously patrolled city streets with firearms and cameras,
and other civil rights organizations conducted unarmed patrols in groups.77 In
Watts, for example, African American residents formed the Community Alert
Patrol. They drove their own "patrol cars" to heavily policed areas, where they
the telephone interviews or were difficult to contact; as a result, the groups surveyed are not a
representative sample but rather a snapshot of what the diverse practices of copwatching can look like.
Moreover, these interviews predate the rapid expansion of copwatching in conjunction with the
#BlackLivesMatter movement between August 2014 and August 2015.
73. See Kreimer, supra note 7, at 347-48 (describing "iconic" videotape of Rodney King
made spontaneously from George Holliday's window).
74. See Gene Demby, What We See in the Eric Garner Video, and What We Don't, NPR.ORG
(July 29, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2014/07/29/335847224/what-we-see-in-the-
eric-gamer-video-and-what-we-don't.
75. See Melanie Eversley, Man Who Shot S.C. Cell Phone Video Speaks Out, USA TODAY
(Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/04/08/walter-scott-feidin-santana-cell-
phone-video/25497593/ [https://perma.cciB8B5-VF6F].
76. Kreimer, supra note 7, at 343-47; cf Damien Cave & Rochelle Oliver, The Videos That
Are Putting Race and Policing Into Sharp Relief N.Y. TIMES (updated Oct. 24, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interacfive/2015/07/30/us/police-videos-race.html ("Raw video has
thoroughly shaken American policing.").
77. See JOSHUA BLOOM & WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., BLACK AGAINST EMPIRE: THE HISTORY
AND POLITICS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (2013) (describing the Black Panther Party's
community patrol in Oakland, including its demise when the California legislature banned the open
carrying of firearms); Regina Austin, The Next "New Wave ": Law-Genre Documentaries, Laiwyering
in Support of the Creative Process, and Visual Legal Advocacy, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 809, 864-65 (2006) ("A movie camera can be a powerful ally of the vulnerable and a
potent weapon in the hands of the disadvantaged. That was clear to the Black Panthers who filmed
street encounters between citizens and the police."); Terence Cannon, A Night with the Watts
Community Alert Patrol, MOVEMENT, Aug. 1966, at 1, 3.
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observed police conduct and wrote down their observations contemporaneously
on notepads. 78 These practices of organized patrols to monitor police behavior
have continued sporadically since then, with a particular tradition among
African American urban communities. 79 There is also a vibrant and
longstanding history of using video as a mechanism of protecting individuals
engaged in protest s° and fighting human rights abuses throughout the globe.
8
'
In the last two decades, copwatching groups have proliferated at an
unprecedented rate. Of the eighteen groups I conducted interviews with in
2014, all but two began copwatching in the past two decades,82 and eleven
began copwatching within the past five years. Since mid-2014, new organized
copwatching patrols have sprung up in Ferguson, St. Louis, Chicago, New
York City, Baltimore, and Boston,84 and copwatching continues to expand to
new regions of the country.8 5 Many of these new copwatching groups are either
affiliated with a local movement for police accountability or began as a direct,
organized response to a well-publicized incident of police violence caught on
camera. Indeed, veteran copwatchers have traveled to cities such as Ferguson
and Baltimore to train groups in best practices for organized copwatch
patrols.
8 6
Organized copwatching groups generally differ from casual bystanders
filming the police in three important ways. First, organized copwatchers are
strategic-the central idea is to prevent police misconduct rather than to catch
it. Some copwatchers speak of the "three Ds of copwatching": deter, de-
78. See Cannon, supra note 77, at 1, 3 (describing the Community Alert Patrol in Watts).
79. See Telephone Interview with Malcolm X Grassroots Movement, Brooklyn Chapter (Apr.
18, 2014) [hereinafter MXGM Interview] (describing how the group modeled their copwatching
practices on similar patrols in Brooklyn that took place in the 1970s and 1980s).
80. See, e.g., Colin Moynihan, To Get '04 Tapes, City Cites Lost Evidence, N.Y. TIMEs (July
26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/26/nyregion/26video.html (describing the group I-
Witness Video's efforts to aggregate hundreds of videotapes of police conduct during protests against
the 2004 Republican National Convention).
81. See, e.g., Sam Gregory, Introduction, in VIDEO FOR CHANGE: A GUIDE FOR ADVOCACY
AND AcTivisM 12 (Sam Gregory et al. eds., 2005) (describing tradition of using video for change
dating from the 1930s). The organization WITNESS, for example, was founded in 1992 to support the
filming of human rights abuses using handheld cameras; the organization has since become a leader in
helping grassroots groups use smartphones as a form of human rights advocacy. See Our Story,
WITNESS, http://witness.org/about/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/F8B9-MNXR].
82. The two oldest copwatch organizations with which I spoke were Berkeley Copwatch
(founded 1990) and Portland Copwatch (founded 1992).
83. See Appendix A (list of copwatching organizations and years they began copwatching).
84. See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 10 (describing a new group in Ferguson, the
"Canfield Watchmen," in which two dozen residents have formed a copwatch team); Kochman, supra
note 10 (describing a copwatching organization that is training new copwatching groups in all five
boroughs of New York City in fall 2014); see also supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Midwest WeCopwatch Regional Groups Form, WECOPWATCH (Jan. 4, 2015),
http://www.wecopwatch.org/midwest-wecopwatch-regional-groups-fon-r/ [http://pena.ec/BA7Z-
8TBL] (describing a coalition of people interested in forming copwatching groups in Wisconsin,
Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, and Missouri).
86. See id (describing trainings in Missouri and Baltimore conducted by WeCopwatch).
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escalate, and document.8 7 The heart of organized copwatching is planned group
patrols, in which members patrol specific neighborhoods with video cameras,
often but not always in uniforms such as t-shirts, badges, or hats.88 Members of
the patrol are frequently drawn from the neighborhood in which the patrol is
89happening; for some groups, this is a requirement. Many groups require that
patrols consist of at least four people at a time, with at least two cameras--one
held by someone close to the police encounter, and one aimed at the person
doing the recording. 90 The filming is often thoughtful and deliberate;
copwatchers may ask the police questions about their actions and engage in
dialogue about constitutional principles.9' The copwatchers also explain to
people interacting with the police what the copwatchers are doing, and seek
permission to film. 92 The reported experience of copwatchers engaging in
organized patrols is that police officers view copwatchers differently than the
police do casual observers or recorders. One organization representative
described it this way:
[W]hen [we] do [our] patrols and wear the cop watch patches, [I]
learned quickly that there was a sort of respect that we got that was
different than if it was a regular person without some kind of label on
them-police try to intimidate, etc. When [we] would go out in groups
of [three to five] people with the labels, made the police see another
uniform-you are doing your job, we are doing our job. 93
Second, unlike casual observers of the police, organized copwatching
groups engage in a series of additional activities that support and complement
their group patrols. Every group with which I spoke, for example, conducts
87. See Alex-Quan Pham, Cop Watch Trains Community to Document NYPD, GOTHAM
GAZETTE (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/governent/5376-cop-watch-
trains-community-to-remain-vigilant-in-documenting-nypd [http://perma.cc/3BTE-PUDS] (describing
the discussion of the three Ds of copwatching at a training).
88. See, e.g., MXGM Interview, supra note 79; Telephone Interview by Sophie Gebreselassie
with Redwood Curtain Copwatch (Mar. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Redwood Interview]; Copwatch
Network Description, PEOPLE'S JUSTICE, http://www.peoplesjustice.org/site/index.php/Cop-Watch-
Network-Description/Cop-Watch-Network-Description.html ("Part of the purpose of Cop Watch is to
be visible to our community members and to the NYPD. By identifying ourselves, our community
members will not only know who we are, but we will also demonstrate an organized and unified
resistance to police misconduct and brutality. Therefore, teams should wear Cop Watch buttons or
clothing and distribute Know Your Rights and Cop Watch materials.").
89. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with L.A. Cmty. Action Network (May 9, 2014)
[hereinafter LA CAN Interview]; MXGM Interview, supra note 79.
90. See, e.g., Copblocking 101, COP BLOCK, http://www.copblock.org/copblockingl01
[http://perma.cc/P8TW-KEBG] (describing best practices as including two different cameras);
MALCOLM X GRASSROOTS MOVEMENT, COP WATCH PROGRAM MANUAL (undated) (on file with
author) (laying out the roles of different members of copwatch teams).
91. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
92. See LA CAN Interview, supra note 89; see also Forrest Stuart, Constructing Police Abuse
After Rodney King: How Skid Row Residents and the Los Angeles Police Department Contest Video
Evidence, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 327, 340-45 (2011) (describing filming strategies of LA CAN
community patrol teams on Skid Row).
93. Redwood Interview, supra note 88.
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"Know Your Rights" trainings in the neighborhoods they patrol. The vast
majority of groups maintain websites, Facebook pages, or online video
databases that catalog and describe videos of interest.94 Many groups also
attend court proceedings that relate to the videos they record or the police
practices they contest.95 Although these basic tactics remain constant across
copwatching organizations, the political orientations of the groups vary
greatly-some groups advocate a libertarian perspective, some a progressive
one, some a more anarchist bent, and some a range of political perspectives.
96
As a result, some groups-ten of the eighteen with which I spoke-engage in
larger efforts at political advocacy, including attending community policing
meetings, lobbying for reform, and pushing for affirmative class action
litigation; while others, in contrast, withdraw from formal political processes
entirely.
Third, although police accountability is a primary purpose of organized
copwatching, for many but not all copwatching groups this accountability
function goes hand in hand with a secondary purpose-the building of power
and organizing for larger change in the criminal justice system. In other words,
many organized copwatchers are part of social movements. 97 Here are some
examples of how copwatching organizations describe their relationships to
larger movements for change:
[We are] building a movement against police violence and systemic
racism in New York City... [and dedicated] to strengthen[ing] and
empower[ing] Latino communities to hold police accountable. 98
[Our mission is to] organize and empower community residents to
94. Of the eighteen groups, fifteen maintain websites, fifteen maintain Facebook pages, and
eleven manage public online video databases.
95. Eleven of eighteen groups reported engaging in courtwatching.
96. See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Sophie Gebreselassie with Peaceful Streets Project
Austin (Feb. 21, 2014) [hereinafter PSP Austin Interview] (describing how the group has both
conservatives and liberals as members, as well as representatives from both Occupy Austin and the
Tea Party).
97. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of
Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1436, 1508 (2005) ("[Plrogressive social movements are
instances of insurgent political activity, usually initiated by or on behalf of low-status or socially
marginal citizens, that are unmediated by the state or conventional political structures."); Michael
McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 17, 23
(2006) (defining a social movement as a "sustained series of interactions between power-holders and
persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in
the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for changes in the distribution or
exercise of power" (quoting Charles Tilly, Social Movements and National Politics, in STATEMAKING
AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTs: ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND THEORY 306 (Charles Bright & Susan Harding
eds., 1984))); Gerald Torres & Lani Guinier, The Constitutional Imaginary: Just Stories About We the
People, 71 MD. L. REv. 1052, 1068 (2012) ("Social movements are different than interest groups or
political organizations because they usually make their claims in ways that are more dynamic,
contentious, and participatory than the usual interest group or civic association.").
98. Telephone Interview with The Justice Committee N.Y.C. (May 5, 2014) (quoting in part
from the organization's website) [hereinafter Justice Committee Interview].
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work collectively to change the relationships of power that affect our
community.
99
Our overriding goal is to create a climate of resistance to abuse of
authority by police organizations and to empower local people with a
structure that can take on police brutality and actually bring it to an
end. 100
We are part of a larger effort to reassert community control over the
police. Police should be servants-not oppressors--of the
community. 101
While not every copwatching group with which I spoke views their mission in
these precise terms, every group sought to articulate a vision of a world in
which police officers act differently with respect to disempowered
populations-a world, moreover, in which those power imbalances were
reduced or dismantled. Since I conducted these interviews in early 2014, many
copwatching groups-both new and old-have formed close links to the
#BlackLivesMatter movement and other movements against police violence,
thus enhancing their connections to larger efforts at social and political
change.'°2
Copwatching is not a unitary practice. One considerable variation is in the
extent to which groups are willing to work with police departments to seek
piecemeal reforms: some groups meet with police officers regularly; some
groups participate in "stakeholder" meetings with local police departments
engaged in community policing; some groups lobby for local policing changes;
and some groups, in contrast, refuse to work with police departments in any
way. Not surprisingly, copwatching organizations disagree with each other
over which of these approaches is preferable.l13 So while I am not describing a
universal practice, I tease out the different ways in which copwatching
functions as a form of police accountability below.
Organized copwatching connects police conduct toward individuals to the
effect of that conduct on communities. At the same time, copwatching
substantiates the effect of policing on communities: but for distrust of and
anger over police conduct, copwatching might not be so prevalent.
Copwatching functions as a form of participatory police accountability in at
least three ways: for deterrence of police misconduct, for data collection, and
99. LA CAN Interview, supra note 89.
100. Telephone Interview with Communities United Against Police Brutality (Apr. 14, 2014)
[hereinafter CUAPB Interview] (quoting from the organization's website).
101. Telephone Interview by Sophie Gebreselassie with Copwatch of East Atlanta (Feb. 29,
2014) [hereinafter Copwatch of East Atlanta Interview] (quoting from the organization's website).
102. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Peaceful Streets Project N.Y.C. (Mar. 14, 2014)
(describing another group as too "militaristic"); Telephone Interview by Sophie Gebreselassie with
Virginia Copblock (Apr. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Virginia Copblock Interview] ("[T]he way that [other
groups] conduct themselves is counterproductive."). I express my own normative preference for
agonistic over antagonistic forms of organized copwatching in Part IV, infra.
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for the substantive contours of Fourth Amendment reasonableness doctrine.
This Part explores each of these functions in turn.
B. Copwatching as Deterrence
Deterring police misconduct is notoriously difficult. 10 4 For example,
studies show that the remedy of excluding evidence insufficiently deters
unconstitutional police conduct, 0 5 in part because suppression hearings are
infrequent and remote in time. 10 6 Moreover, police officers are indemnified
from liability in the vast majority of civil rights lawsuits that they lose.' 0 7 Also,
although the Department of Justice has the ability to sue-and has sued-
police departments for a pattern and practice of constitutional violations, such
lawsuits require an abundance of data about policing practices that is often
difficult to acquire.l1S
Copwatching deters police misconduct in real time. With copwatching,
observation itself serves as a form of deterrence. 10 9 Social science confirms that
people behave better when they know that they are being watched."0 With
respect to policing, studies show that police behave differently when they know
they are being recorded by surveillance cameras" or are in the presence of
104. See Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 34, at 1618-36 (documenting the "illusory
deterrence" of traditional sanctions for misconduct); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2548-49
n.368 (1996) (describing how weak enforcement mechanisms in criminal procedure can 'legitimate'
the exercise of police power").
105. See, e.g., Michael D. Cicchini, An Economics Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule and
Deterrence, 75 Mo. L. REV. 459, 469-71 (2010) (providing an economic analysis of why current
Supreme Court doctrine surrounding the exclusionary rule does not deter police misconduct); William
C. Heffeman & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The
Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311, 361 n. 123 (1991).
106. See Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 34, at 1618-36 (discussing remoteness and
infrequency of suppression hearings); see also infra notes 130-36 (discussing additional problems of
discovery, narrative, and doctrine that skew the results of suppression hearings).
107. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 912-17 (2014)
(showing that police officers are indemnified from damages under section 1983 suits more than 99
percent of the time).
108. See Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MAR.Q. L. REv. 1119,
1122 (2013) ("[W]hile existing federal law and agency efforts provide for some data collection about
policing, those efforts are flawed, stymied by institutional and legal limitations.").
109. Cf I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959,
986 (2013) ("[C]amera surveillance has the potential 'to increase the police's accountability to the
public, while decreasing their account ability,' or their ability to 'patrol the facts."' (internal citations
omitted)); Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police Regulation
by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 102-03 (2012) (describing the disciplining effect
of government-controlled surveillance of the police).
110. See, e.g., Mir Adnan Ali et al., Measuring the Effect of Sousveillance in Increasing
Socially Desirable Behavior, 2013 IEEE INT'L SYMP. ON TECH. & Soc'Y 266, 266-67; Melissa
Bateson et al., Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real- World Setting, 2006 BIOLOGY
LETTERS 412.
111. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Goold, Public Area Surveillance and Police Work: The Impact of
CCTV on Police Behavior and Autonomy, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC'Y 191, 194 (2003) (finding that
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spectators. 112 Not only do copwatching organizations film police officers, they
also engage the police in dialogue about officer behavior and constitutional
rules. 113 Research in the social sciences demonstrates that pausing to think
through or articulate a reason for an action limits the effects of implicit biases
on that action. 114 By speaking with the officers on camera, copwatchers may be
able to bring constitutional rules to the forefront of officers' minds and limit
the effect of unconscious biases on officers' behavior.
Although copwatching shares some deterrent effects with police-worn
cameras, 115 copwatching has the potential to be a more powerful deterrent than
police-worn cameras because the cameras and footage remain in the control of
civilians rather than the state. This means that the observation of copwatchers
is backed up by the implicit threat that any video captured can be used in the
future, not only in formal legal proceedings-civilian review boards, internal
monitoring agencies, and courts-but also in the "wild" (i.e., unregulated)
public sphere. 16 The vast majority of copwatching organizations post videos
on their websites or Facebook pages, and many of them maintain YouTube
feeds as well. When residents are doing the filming, police officers cannot turn
two-thirds of British police officers interviewed reported that they were more careful when under
surveillance of CCTV cameras).
112. See HANS TOCH, COPWATCH: SPECTATORS, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND POLICE REFORM 39
(2012) (describing interviews with police officers who stated that they behave differently in the
presence of spectators). Some studies also show that complaints of abuse go down in jurisdictions in
which police are required to wear cameras on their uniforms. See Rory Carroll, California Police Use
of Body Cameras Cuts Violence and Complaints, GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/04/califonia-police-body-cameras-cuts-violence-
complaints-rialto [http://perna.cc/U79B-DTRL]; OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON MODERN POLICING: RESEARCH AND BEST
PRACTICES (2004), http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0404-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6E2-
Q937].
113. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
114. See Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 34, at 1637-46, 1643 (collecting studies and arguing
that "[t]he debiasing and accountability literatures suggest that police decision[ ]making can be
improved if accountable police officers are forced to consider counterarguments and to think about the
harm caused by their actions"); cf L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment,
87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1153-55 (2012) (describing how implicit social cognitions impair the ability of
police officers to determine what constitutes "reasonable suspicion").
115. Police-worn body cameras are a reform for which a number of scholars have advocated in
recent years. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Watching the Watchers, 82 MiSs. L.J. 821, 825 (2013); Bar-Gill &
Friedman, supra note 34, at 1673-74; David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head
Cams) as Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357,
357-60 (2010); Luna, supra note 55, at 1169-70; Christopher Slobogin, Community Control over
Camera Surveillance: A Response to Bennett Capers's Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 993, 997 (2013). But see Wasserman, supra note 20, at 839 (arguing that "the
deterrent effect [of body cameras] may not be as great as many hope").
116. See TOCH, supra note 112, at 91-130 (describing the effect of social media on police
practices in Seattle); Jtirgen Habermas, Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy
Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research, 16
COMM. THEORY 411, 416 (2006) ("[A]ttitudes [about political issues] are influenced by everyday talk
in the informal settings or episodic publics of civil society at least as much as they are by paying
attention to print or electronic media.").
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off the cameras when they do not want to be filmed,' 17 require complicated
discovery requests before the footage is released, l" 8 or refuse to turn over any
footage at all' 9-all problems that have emerged with police-controlled
cameras. Moreover, the "misconduct" that copwatchers prevent is not only the
constitutional misconduct that is the traditional subject of litigation, but also
what the copwatchers perceive as misconduct-for example, foul language or
other forms of disrespect-and might therefore submit to social media as
such. 120 These potential consequences of misconduct, perceived or real, may
loom larger in a police officer's mind than, say, the remote threat that if she
recovers contraband it may someday be excluded from a trial. Unlike with
video evidence relevant to a suppression hearing, there need not be contraband
recovered-or even an arrest-for the video to have an effect.
Copwatching uses group observation backed up by cameras to transfer
power from the police to the people. Social theorists have termed the turning of
surveillance instruments on those in power-watching the watchers-as
"sousveillance," or surveillance from below.12' Sousveillance serves as a
counter to the disciplining effects of surveillance; it is a technique for pushing
back against the monopoly of those in power over information, technology, and
control. 122 With sousveillance, observation becomes a form of resistance.
23
117. See, e.g., Robert Gammon, OPD Needs to Start Using Its Lapel Cameras, EAST BAY
ExPRESS (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/opd-needs-to-start-using-its-lapel-
cameras/Content?oid=3756595 [http://perma.cc/5DMA-YYHD]. In Los Angeles, one internal
inspection found that about half of the estimated eighty cars in one patrol division had cameras or
microphones that had been tampered with or removed by officers. See Joel Rubin, LAPD Officers
Tampered with In-Car Recording Equipment, Records Show, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2014),
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/apr/07/localfla-me-lapd-tamper-20140408 [http://perma.cc/MDF6-
JT4R].
118. See, e.g., Sara Libby, Even When Police Do Wear Cameras, Don't Count on Seeing the
Footage, CITYLAB (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/crime/2014/08/even-when-police-do-
wear-cameras-you-cant-count-on-ever-seeing-the-footage/378690/ [http://perma.cc/68KT-B2JG];
Sestanovich, supra note 20 ("The urgent question now is not who will use the cameras, but who will
be allowed to see the footage."). That said, there are privacy concerns with releasing all footage-
concerns that will be discussed in Part Il.A, infra.
119. Libby, supra note 118.
120. See Tracey L. Meares et al., Lawful or Fair? How Cops and Laypeople View Good
Policing (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 255, 2014),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstract__id=2116645 [https://perma.cc/JFY5-ZWTL]
(showing that lay people's conceptions of good policing fall more along the lines of fairness than
lawfulness); Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies
and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 350-62 (2011) (arguing
that, to maintain legitimacy, police should not limit their conceptions of fairness to the constitutional
minimum).
121. See, e.g., Steve Mann & Joseph Ferenbok, New Media and the Power Politics of
Sousveillance in a Surveillance-Dominated World, 11 SURVEILLANCE & SOC'Y 18, 26 (2013) ("The
practice of viewing from below when coupled with political action becomes a balancing force that
helps-in democratic societies-move the overall 'state' toward a kind of veillance (monitoring)
equilibrium....").
122. Professor Steven Mann, who coined the term, describes sousveillance as a technique
"toward uncovering the panopticon and undercutting its primacy and privilege." Steve Mann et al.,
2016]
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
And sousveillance is a technique of deterrence, much like Jeremy Bentham's
original panopticon, which was designed to prevent prison misconduct through
a constant threat of surveillance. 1
24
The reported experiences of copwatching organizations bear out this
function of copwatching as deterrence. For although copwatchers seek to
record misconduct if it happens, for the most part they report that their routine
patrols (in contrast to patrols of planned protests) are relatively uneventful. One
organization representative reported that in the first six years of copwatching,
their patrols did not come upon any active scenes of police brutality, which to
him "doesn't mean [police abuse] doesn't exist, but means that the presence of
an organized body of people with camera[s] prevents it."' 125 Another group's
representative stated that, in the group's experience, "when people stop and
watch the police and the police are aware that they're being watched, it
frequently has the impact of deescalating the situation or not allowing the
situation to escalate." 126 Although it may not be surprising in a self-reported
study, every group with which I spoke reported that they believe that their
practice of copwatching changes police behavior to some degree.
The deterrent effect of copwatching is surely an uneven one; unlike
police-worn cameras or a twenty-four-hour surveillance camera, copwatchers
are not always present, nor is their footage always preserved. But copwatching
does not operate at the expense of other forms of deterrence or enforcement,
including those that use deliberative processes to bring the "voice" of
community residents to the "ears" of police departments. Indeed, a number of
copwatching organizations have been actively involved in community policing
activities or meetings between police departments and community
organizations related to federal litigation.' 27 Copwatching thus serves as a
Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance
Environments, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC'Y 331, 333 (2003); see Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and
Computers: The First Amendment and Networked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 66-67 (2007)
(describing how sousveillance can be an empowering activity in the context of public protests).
123. Resistance, here, refers to the Foucaultian concept of the ditfuse resistance to power that
can come in everyday activities. See generally Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, in MICHEL
FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 208, 210 (Hubert L. Dreyfus & Paul
Rabinow eds., 2d ed. 1983).
124. See JEREMY BENTHAM, Letter VI, in THE PANOPTICON; OR, THE INSPECTION-HOUSE
(Dodo Press 2008) (1787); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
195-231 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books ed. 1979) (1975); cf Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of
Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1953 (2013) ("[T]he gathering of information affects the
power dynamic between the watcher and the watched, giving the watcher greater power to influence or
direct the subject of surveillance.").
125. MXGM Interview, supra note 79. Since that time, however, MXGM has caught several
instances of police violence on film. Id.
126. Justice Committee Interview, supra note 98.
127. See, e.g., id. (describing the Justice Committee's involvement with the Floyd litigation and
their hope to participate in the stakeholder meetings mandated by the NYPD settlement); LA CAN
Interview, supra note 89 (describing their attendance at community policing meetings and their
advocacy for more of those meetings); Telephone Interview by Sophie Gebreselassie with Portland
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complement to, and not a substitute for, already existing mechanisms of
deterrence, including police-worn cameras and formal community meetings.
C. Copwatching as Data Collection
Copwatching also complements current efforts to improve the collection
of evidence of potential misconduct and data about policing practices more
broadly. 128 As data collectors and aggregators-both of individual instances of
misconduct and of larger policing trends--copwatchers bump up against the
traditional monopoly that police departments possess over the evidence of and
narratives structuring their behavior on the street.
129
Police departments have long controlled official narratives of their
officers' behavior.' 30 To begin with, in the world of plea bargaining, victims of
police misconduct claims rarely have the opportunity to air those claims in
open court or even to receive copies of police videos or documentation.131
When claims do reach open court, evidence of reasons for a stop or search
comes almost exclusively from police officers themselves, which allows room
for police to craft doctrine-friendly narratives,' 3 2 fudge the truth,133 and claim
good faith. 134 When combined with the bias inherent in a judicial determination
Copwatch Project (Apr. 16, 2014) (describing their involvement with public hearings relating to the
specifics of the police department's settlement with the Department of Justice).
128. For calls for better data collection about department-wide practices, see, for example, Fan,
supra note 109, at 101-03; Harmon, supra note 59, at 29-30; Luna, supra note 55, at 1167-70.
129. See SKOLNICK, supra note 18, at 12; Kreimer, supra note 7, at 344,357; Jim Dwyer, When
Official Truth Combines with Cheap Digital Technology, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/nyregion/30about.html? [https://perma.cc/6DND-EL5W]
(describing how videos of police behavior by spectators using mobile technology have "ended a
monopoly on the history of public gatherings that was limited to the official narratives").
130. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820,
852 (1994) (describing "the inevitable bias injected by hindsight in decision[ ]making, the problems of
police perjury, and the unreliability of police officers as the primary administrators of amorphous
standards of 'reasonableness').
131. Cf Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 321 (2005) ("Once an officer makes an arrest, it is for all intents and
purposes insulated from any meaningful challenge or review."). Moreover, after United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), defendants are limited in their ability to collect information about
policing or prosecutorial practices from discovery in criminal cases.
132. See Ron Bacigal, A Brave New World of Stop and Frisk, 18 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC.
JUST. 83, 87-89 (2011) (describing how police craft narratives); Dorfnan, supra note 35, at 472-73
(describing a "grey zone of morality" that police inhabit and judges accept when litigating Fourth
Amendment claims); Reynolds & Steakley, supra note 12, at 1204 (describing "testimonial
advantage" of police officers).
133. See Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5-
12 (2010) (collecting studies documenting police perjury and "testilying" in suppression hearings).
134. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009). For a description of the expanding
scope of good faith exceptions in the last two decades, see generally TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S EXCLUSIONARY RULE 302-48 (2013).
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in the face of seized contraband, 135 the result is that defendants lose the vast
majority of suppression hearings. 136
Copwatching changes this calculus in two senses-first, by documenting
video evidence from the point of view of the lay bystander; and second, by
collecting data controlled by the public rather than the state. Whether on the
internet or in the courtroom, having videos and testimony from the point of
view of observers rather than the police takes away the traditional monopoly
that police officers have to narrate and draw conclusions about the facts of day-
to-day encounters. Literally, the point of view matters: people perceive videos
differently based on the angle from which they are shot and who has done the
shooting. 1
37
More than that, the context of videos recorded as part of copwatching
patrols may affect the interpretation of those videos. The presence of observers
from the neighborhood who have seen fit to distribute a given video is a
reminder to the viewer that officer conduct affects not only the person
interacting directly with the police but also that person's neighbors, friends,
and others who interact with those same officers.138 This point of view-of, for
lack of a better word, the community-is one missing from the adjudication of
individual cases and many popular accounts of criminal justice as well.
Moreover, videos taken by organized copwatching groups are more likely to
contain footage that shows an interaction from beginning to end, rather than
only filming from a moment of conflict or violence, as a casual bystander
might.13
9
I do not mean to overstate the power of video. 140 Video is not objective,
but rather depends on the context, point of view, and cultural experiences of its
viewers. Some copwatchers recognize this, adjusting by engaging in
135. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 788 (1970) ("Under the exclusionary rule, judicial attention is focused
upon an evidentiary product of the practices rather than upon the practices themselves."); Bar-Gill &
Friedman, supra note 34, at 1623 ("[P]ost hoc bias has done more to undermine the utility of
exclusion-and indeed the Fourth Amendment generally-than any other quality of the exclusionary
rule."); Steiker, supra note 130, at 853-55.
136. Cf Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1 (2013)
(documenting that since 1990, the Supreme Court has sided with government interests in
approximately eight out often criminal procedure cases).
137. See Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333,
1347-60 (2010) (discussing the social science of camera perspective bias and its impact on video
evidence in court).
138. Cf TOCH, supra note 112, at xvii-xxi, 3-5 (describing how when spectators gather near
police conduct, it gives the police conduct public significance); Simonson, supra note 24, at 2202-05
(describing this phenomenon in the context of the audience in the courtroom).
139. See Stuart, supra note 92, at 339-40 (describing importance of video capturing an
interaction from start to finish).
140. For more on the drawbacks of video, see infra Part 1.C.
141. See Dan M. Kahan et al., "'They Saw a Protest": Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-
Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851 (2012) [hereinafter Kahan et al., Protest]; Dan M. Kahan
et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism,
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dialogue with officers during the taking of video so as to lock them into an
explanation142 or simply remaining skeptical as to the public reception of their
videos. 143 Other copwatchers, in contrast, believe that "cameras don't lie."' 44
But the point remains that videos recorded by members of the public, and
especially by organized copwatchers, are different in kind than those recorded
by surveillance or police-worn cameras.
Similarly, copwatching organizations' control over their videos is
important not just for its deterrent effect, described above, 145 but also because
the videos are in the possession of populations that have historically lacked
access to data about policing practices.146 Part of the power of copwatching as
sousveillance is this control over the video evidence 147: the power to edit or
delete videos, post them to larger databases, and provide context or
commentary to them. This control over videos and information gives
copwatching organizations the ability to share their experiences with more
privileged populations who may not experience the same day-to-day
interactions with the police-to "document [police practices] so that we c[an]
convince others that this [i] s actually happening., 148 An official police effort to
frame an event or a policy may quickly be disputed by counternarratives from
copwatching groups that are ready and waiting. In New York City, for instance,
copwatching groups were an integral part of a Twitter campaign to respond to
an NYPD request for photos of citizens with police officers; already in
possession of countless photos and videos, copwatching groups flooded Twitter
with pictures of police abuse under the "#mynypd" hashtag, making front page
news. 149 For example, one photo retweeted more than a thousand times in 24
122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 879-81 (2009) [hereinafter Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?] (discussing study
showing that conclusions about the police conduct in Scott v. Harris video vary based on demographic
characteristics); Stuart, supra note 92, at 328-33 (discussing the "social construction of video
evidence").
142. See, e.g., Stuart, supra note 92, at 341-43 (describing LA CAN's Community Watch
Commander's strategy of asking police officers questions about their training and knowledge while
videotaping their interactions with Skid Row residents).
143. See, e.g., LA CAN Interview, supra note 89; MXGM Interview, supra note 79; Telephone
Interview with People's Justice for Cmy. Control & Police Accountability (Apr. 25, 2014)
[hereinafter People's Justice Interview].
144. Virginia Copblock Interview, supra note 103.
145. See supra notes 109-27 and accompanying text.
146. See Gerald P. Lrpez, Shaping Community Problem Solving Around Community
Knowledge, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 64-65 (2004) (describing problem of lack of data and knowledge
within low-income communities).
147. See Mann et al., supra note 122, at 332-34 (describing control over captured footage as a
key component of sousveillance).
148. BERKELEY COPWATCH, TtE BERKELEY COPwATCH HANDBOOK: AN INTRODUCTION TO
CITIZEN MONITORING OF THE POLICE 3 (2014) (on file with author) (describing founding of Berkeley
Copwatching in 1990 in response to order-maintenance policing initiative).
149. See Lauren Victoria Burke, #MyNIPD: NYPD Hashtag Blows up into Embarrassing
Social Media Fiasco, POLITIC 365 (Apr. 22, 2014), http'/politic365.coni2014/04/22/mynypd-nypd-
hashtag-blows-up-into-embarrassing-social-media-fiasco/ [http://perma.cc/97AP-8LU] ('The folks at
@copwatch had a particularly energetic time using the #MyNYPD hashtag."); Thomas Tracy et al.,
2016]
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
hours showed a picture of a police officer wielding a baton over the body of an
unarmed man, captioned in part, "the #nypd engages with its community
members."' 50 Through social media, copwatching organizations have the power
to convert individual police encounters into public events. Moreover, when
copwatchers are part of larger protests in response to police violence, such as
those in Ferguson and Baltimore, they are able to provide real-time updates via
social media that often contradict official reports in the popular media.'
51
Copwatching organizations also engage in larger data collection practices
that do not involve video. For example, one organization is collecting data on
individuals who the police have brought into custody for noncustodial ticket
offenses. This practice of ticketing may not look out of the ordinary on video,
but when captured in the aggregate, it can say a lot about the exercise of police
discretion in particular neighborhoods.' 52 Another organization engages in
"People's Investigations" in response to incidents of police brutality, whether
or not there is video; they interview witnesses, submit Freedom of Information
Act requests, and write up public reports on their findings.' 53 As with videos,
these larger data collection practices are no substitute for internal,
comprehensive collection efforts already in practice and sometimes distributed
to the public.154 However, the information copwatching organizations collect
could certainly be useful to police supervisors and administrators as a form of
public feedback. 155 And these information-collecting practices are an important
function of copwatching organizations as data collectors on behalf of the
public.
#myNYPD Twitter Campaign Backfires, Promotes Photos of Police Brutality Instead of Positive
Encounters with Public, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/nypd-twitter-campaign-mynypd-backfires-article-1.1765159#ixzz32BDZiVKT (describing the
barrage of police brutality photos under the #mynypd hashtag).
150. Occupy Wall Street (@OccupyWallStNYC), TWn-TER (Apr. 22 2014, 2:12 PM),
https://twitter.com/OccupyWallStNYC/status/458684716447973376 [https://perma.cc/RC82-
NN3G?type=image].
151. See Day, supra note 9 (describing how in Ferguson and Baltimore "activists [took] to
Twitter to highlight the contradictions between police reports and eyewitness accounts").
152. See E-mail Newsletter from People's Justice (May 20, 2014) (on file with author).
153. See, e.g., BERKELEY COPWATCH, PEOPLE'S INVESTIGATION: IN-CUSTODY DEATH OF
KAYLA MOORE (2013), http://www.berkeleycopwatch.org/resources/PeoplesInvestigation-
Kayla Moore_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/7XYN-VZUM].
154. Cf Gerald P. LUpez, How Mainstream Reformers Design Ambitious Reentry Programs
Doomed to Fail and Destined to Reinforce Targeted Mass Incarceration and Social Control, 11
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 84-85 (2014) (critiquing the "rule of experts" in seeking
evidence-based strategies for reentry).
155. Cf Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving?" For Everyone (and Everything?), 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1763-64 (2006) (proposing "How's My Policing?" program that aggregates
citizen feedback on police officers).
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D. Copwatching as Constitutional Engagement
Copwatching is also a way for local populations to express-to each
other, to their neighbors, to the police, and to the larger public-their
communal stake in the constitutional regulation of the police. In particular,
copwatching challenges the control that courts and police officers have in
determining what is "reasonable" or "suspicious" with regard to the Fourth
Amendment. A flip side of this constitutional engagement is that copwatching
reveals the limits of the Fourth Amendment: through their presence,
copwatchers require that police officers pay attention to seemingly
extraconstitutional concerns such as dignity and fairness. This pressure, in turn,
lends popular legitimacy to efforts to expand the possibilities of what the
Fourth Amendment can do.
Two aspects of the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure doctrine stand
out in the context of copwatching, both of which require a determination of
"reasonableness" based on the realities of human experience and behavior,' 56
but in practice do not account for the day-to-day experiences of disempowered
populations.'
57
The first is the "reasonable suspicion" that an officer must possess to
conduct a Terry stop, or a "stop and frisk.' 58 Reasonable suspicion is satisfied
when a reasonable officer, based on "experience and specialized training," can
articulate sensible-sensible to her and to a court-reasons for the stop.' 59 This
means that, for example, when a court evaluates whether a police officer has
reasonable suspicion to stop someone who runs away from the police, it does
not matter whether the person running away reasonably fears police brutality
because of years of harassment and arrests of people who look like them in
156. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) ("In reviewing the propriety of
an officer's conduct.... the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense
judgments and inferences about human behavior.").
157. See Janice Nadler, Consent, Dignity, and the Failure of Scattershot Policing, in
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA, supra note 39, at 93-94
("[T]he Court tends to take the perspective of law enforcement, and so the rules of engagement created
by the Court are sometimes based on highly questionable assumptions about what citizens in these
situations believe and understand."); Bowers & Robinson, supra note 40, at 223 (describing how when
the Court determines "reasonableness" in the context of criminal procedure, "the Court has done
almost no work to determine whether its conceptions of the reasonable layperson dovetail with what
people actually find fair in a given context"); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher,
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look
at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 730-31 (1993)
(describing results of study indicating that society's views of reasonable expectation of privacy differ
from that of the Supreme Court). For discussions of how this plays out in the context of race, see Paul
Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH L. REv. 245, 247-53 (2010); Carbado, supra
note 40, at 970-78; David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660-75 (1994); L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Police
Character, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 267, 268-73 (2012); Thompson, supra note
25, at 998-99.
158. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10(1968).
159. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,273 (2002); see Terry, 392 U.S. at9-10.
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their neighborhood. 160 Nor can a court consider any harm to neighborhoods or
communities when deciding the reasonableness of an officer's conduct.
161
Instead, courts and officers are the sole judges of whether an officer's suspicion
was reasonable.
Second, a similar dynamic plays out in the definition of a seizure in the
context of street encounters. According to the Court, a seizure occurs
"whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away,"' 62 or when "a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave."' 163 This test "presupposes an innocent person."' 164 These two
standards of reasonableness interact: in Wardlow, for instance, the Court held
that if a person runs away from the police, that fact can contribute to an
officer's "reasonable suspicion.' ' 65 A court's determination of reasonableness,
though, may not align with the views of society, 166 much less of minorities
residing in high crime areas who may interact with police officers more
frequently. 1
67
Copwatchers bring the expertise of the people to bear on determinations
of what constitutes reasonable conduct-both in the moment and after the fact.
They do this in a number of ways: by educating themselves and bringing what
they learn to other avenues of reform, by speaking with officers on the street,
by their presence in court, and by their contributions to the public sphere.
When copwatching groups watch or criticize police behavior, this criticism
comes not from a lone criminal suspect simultaneously trying to avoid
prosecution but from residents and citizens with an interest in reducing crime in
160. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(describing innocent reasons that people, "particularly minorities and those residing in high crime
areas," might be afraid of contact with the police); see also Bacigal, supra note 132, at 92 ("The price
for a colorblind Fourth Amendment is that the Court ignores real people and determines constitutional
rights according to the perceptions of hypothetical persons, reasonably prudent or otherwise."); Butler,
supra note 157, at 250-51 (discussing the problem of colorblindness in Wardlow); Tracey Maclin, The
Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv.
1258, 1328 (1990) (observing that the reasonable suspicion standard "gravely limits the right[s]" of
individuals to move about the streets freely by "pennit[ting] the Court to defer to police intuition and
subjectivity").
161. See Baradaran, supra note 136, at 20-30; cf Harmon, supra note 14, at 778 ("Every arrest
harms an individual, and perhaps a community, no matter how lawful.").
162. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
163. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429,436 (1991) (holding that a seizure does not occur when "a reasonable person would feel free
to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter").
164. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438 (emphasis omitted).
165. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25.
166. See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 40, at 223; Luna, supra note 67, at 846 (questioning
whether judges should determine society's reasonable expectations of privacy); Slobogin &
Schumacher, supra note 157, at 730-31 (finding that society's views of reasonable expectation of
privacy differ from that of the Supreme Court).
167. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(criticizing the Court majority for overlooking innocent reasons that people, "particularly minorities
and those residing in high crime areas," might fear contact with the police).
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their neighborhoods and encouraging good police behavior in line with
constitutional principles. They are "innocent" people, but not the "innocent"
people who usually make official determinations of what is reasonable.
168
The constitutional engagement of copwatchers begins on the street or in
the road. Members of copwatch groups who take out their cameras in public
consciously inject their own view of what is "reasonable" into a police officer's
calculus of whether they are acting within the bounds of the Fourth
Amendment. Copwatchers come to these interactions with a thorough
knowledge of the rights of individuals with respect to the police. 69 Rather than
challenge an officer's reasonable suspicion to stop someone up front, they
advocate practices like asking, "Am I free to go?" and saying calmly, "I do not
consent to this search." When they are copwatching, they ask these questions
on behalf of others, saying, for example, "Officer, is this man free to go?" This
tactic is not just about ensuring that people know their rights. When
copwatchers ask the question "Am I free to go?" or "Is he free to go?" and do
so while wearing uniforms and presenting themselves as a neighborhood group,
they remind the officer both of the constitutional rule itself and of the reality
that a person who lives in their neighborhood may not feel free to go even in a
170
situation where courts tend to hold that they are free to go.
This constitutional engagement continues beyond individual encounters,
making its way both into courtrooms and into the public sphere. A majority 1
71
of copwatching organizations engage in courtwatching: if an incident they film
ends up in court, they attend the court proceeding in a group and as a visible
168. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438. By describing individuals engaged in copwatching as innocent, I
mean that they are not the individuals under suspicion by police officers but rather the ones observing
police conduct. Indeed, all copwatchers may not be "innocent" in the way that the Court meant in
Bostick-, instead, copwatchers call into question the traditional contrast in the Court's jurisprudence
between law-abiding or "innocent" citizens and "criminals" or individuals under suspicion by police
officers.
169. Every copwatch organization with which I spoke conducts "Know Your Rights" trainings
both with their members and in their communities. See also MALCOLM X GRASsROOTS MOVEMENT,
supra note 90, at 154 (describing importance of legal education). Copwatching trainings involve in-
depth "Know Your Rights" education with respect to the First and Fourth Amendments. These
trainings take place not only with official copwatchers, but also in the community. People's Justice, for
instance, conducts "Know Your Rights" trainings throughout the city. See People's Justice Interview,
supra note 143.
170. See David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment's
Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 51, 52-59 (2009) (presenting interview results
showing that most people would not feel "free to leave" a police encounter in situations in which the
Court has held that they would).
171. See Telephone Interview by Sophie Gebreselassie with Berkeley Copwatch (Mar. 29,
2014) [hereinafter Berkeley Copwatch Interview]; Telephone Interview by Sophie Gebreselassie with
Copwatch L.A. - South Cent. Chapter (Apr. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Copwatch LA Interview]; CUAPB
Interview, supra note 100; Justice Committee Interview, supra note 98; LA CAN Interview, supra
note 89; MXGM Interview, supra note 79; Telephone Interview with October 22nd the Coalition to
Prevent Police Brutality Survey (Apr. 28, 2014); People's Justice Interview, supra note 143; PSP
Austin Interview, supra note 96; Redwood Interview, supra note 88; Virginia Copblock Interview,
supra note 103.
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presence, wearing their t-shirts, badges, or other indicia of group identity. Like
copwatching, the purpose of courtwatching is both to support someone and to
remind the other players in the courtroom, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges, that the individual case on the record affects not just the defendant but
also other people who live in that defendant's neighborhood or who experience
similar interactions with the police.' 72 If a judge is deciding an issue of
constitutional importance, that judge might be reminded that one case impacts
larger cases and that the judge's point of view is not necessarily that of all
"reasonable" people who live in her jurisdiction. 173
Copwatching groups also participate in class action litigation that targets
specific department-wide practices. To take a recent example, one dynamic
overlooked in analyses of the 2013 decision holding New York City's stop-
and-frisk practices unconstitutional is that the trial in that case was
accompanied by intense organizing efforts, including by copwatching groups.
Members of copwatching groups were involved in the planning and organizing
of the lawsuit, including serving as named plaintiffs. 174 Every day the
courtroom was packed with members of a different community group, each of
which held a press conference outside of the courthouse during the lunch
break. 175 It is impossible to draw direct inferences from this grassroots pressure
to the Floyd court's eventual finding that NYPD's practices violated the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, especially since the case relied heavily on
extensive data collection and expert testimony. However, it is worth noting that
the unprecedented opinion cited not only traditional Fourth Amendment
doctrine, but also concepts of dignity and race rarely seen in such litigation.'
1 76
172. See JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION,
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC CoURTRooMS 300-10 (2011)
(describing ability of public attendance in criminal court to convert private adjudication into public
phenomena); Simonson, supra note 24, at 2231-32 (describing the use of courtwatching by social
movements to remind judges and prosecutors that their policies affect entire communities).
173. Courts articulate this possibility in the context of the right to a public trial. See, e.g., United
States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2012) ("The presence of the public at sentencing
reminds the participants, especially the judge, that the consequences of their actions extend to the
broader community.").
174. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Justice
Committee Interview, supra note 98 ("[Our organization] was a big part of the precursor to the Floyd
lawsuit.").
175. See, e.g., Email Flyer from Malcolm X Grassroots Movement, People's Justice Coalition,
and the Justice Committee (Mar. 29, 2013) (on file with author) (advertising a day of packing the court
and a press conference outside the courthouse on April 2, 2014).
176. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 673 ("[lIt is 'clear and plain' that the public interest in
liberty and dignity under the Fourth Amendment, and the public interest in equality under the
Fourteenth Amendment, trumps whatever modicum of added safety might theoretically be gained by
the NYPD making unconstitutional stops and frisks."); cf Bowers, supra note 39 (critiquing
irrelevance of dignity to current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Nadler, supra note 157. Floyd
was also an equal protection case, which perhaps explains the focus on race--but the point, here, is
that the district court discusses race in the context of the Fourth Amendment as well. See Floyd, 959 F.
Supp. 2d at 673.
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These debates over the contours of the Fourth Amendment take place in
the public sphere. Popular narratives of criminal justice matter-not just to
public debate and politics but also to formal legal narratives and judicial
decisions.1 77 After conversations with police officers about constitutional
rights, copwatching groups post videos of and comment on those
conversations. 178 In addition to contributing to social and popular media,
organized copwatching groups participate in lawsuits and lobbying, both of
which invoke constitutional rights and use videos to substantiate claims with
respect to those rights. Moreover, organized copwatchers have increasingly
served as observers and documenters of public protests in response to police
violence throughout the nation.' 79 The larger public, in turn, looks to videos
from copwatchers when the legality or fairness of police conduct becomes a
matter of public debate.'
80
Through each of these practices, copwatching organizations can help
change constitutional meaning.' 81 Scholars of legal change have recognized the
power of social movements to shift legal meaning.182 Professor Jack Balkin, for
instance, has studied how social movements can "reshape constitutional
common sense, moving the boundaries of what is plausible and implausible in
the world of constitutional interpretation, what is a thinkable legal argument
177. See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 167-93, 168 (2001) (describing the "political values, cultural
sensibilities, and criminological conceptions" in modem crime control); JONATHAN SIMON,
GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 4 (2007) (discussing importance of "the flow of information,
discourse, and debate" to how the state approaches issues of criminal justice); Allegra M. MeLeod,
The US. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 105,
123-30 (2012) (discussing the relationship of public conceptions of the convergence of immigration
and criminal law to official conceptions of those laws).
178. See, e.g., Falmouth, Maine Traffic Stop, COPBLOCK (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.copblock.org/47056/flamouth-maine-traffic-stop/ [http://perma.cc/XYR6-FV8F]
(discussing a video of a conversation with an officer and the writer's friend about the Fourth and Sixth
Amendments that the writer believes led the officer to decide not to issue a ticket).
179. See, e.g., Andrea Platten, Berkeley Copwatch 's 'Know Your Rights'Event Teaches Police-
Observation Tactics, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (July 8, 2015),
http://www.dailycal.org/2015/07/08/berkeley-copwatchs-know-your-rights-event-teaches-police-
observation-tactics/ [https://perma.cc/S5MC-8CLK] (discussing Berkeley Copwatch training that
"specifically discussed how to approach an event such as the December Black Lives Matter protests").
This support of protests through observation and documentation is of course a part of a long tradition
of legal observing at political protests. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
180. See TOCH, supra note 112, at 91-145 (documenting effect of social media recordings of
police on recent police reforms in Seattle).
181. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 6-11 (1983) (describing how legal meaning can be generated by the people and
not just by courts).
182. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 946 (2006); Guinier & Torres, supra note 17, at 2757-62; McCann, supra
note 69, at 81.
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and what is constitutionally 'off the wall.' 18 3 More recently, Professors Lani
Guinier and Gerald Torres have introduced the concept of demosprudence-the
law of social movements-through which "the language of law is stretched to
accommodate the language of the people.' 84 There is a performative aspect to
organized copwatching that lends power to the ability of copwatching groups to
participate in broader debates over the legal meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Even though copwatching groups are engaged in observation,
their act of observation is recorded, discussed, and remembered. The
performance of copwatching extends beyond the act itself,8 5 and the "language
of the people" makes its way into the public sphere. While it may usually be
"off the wall" to think about race and dignity when determining whether an
officer had reasonable suspicion to stop someone, the engagement of
copwatchers with these concepts moves them closer to "the wall" of what is
constitutionally possible.
By engaging with the legal meaning of the Fourth Amendment, then,
copwatching has the potential to expand the Amendment's reach. As Courts
currently interpret the Fourth Amendment, it does not extend to questions that
govern many police practices and policies: for example, whether police should
be arresting people for low-level crimes, whether they should be targeting
particular neighborhoods, whether they should consider the racial or ethnic
make-up of those neighborhoods, or whether they should take everyone they
arrest into custody pending arraignment. 186 Nor does the Fourth Amendment
require that police officers be polite, explain their behavior, or conform to other
notions of procedural justice-behavior people interacting with the police care
about as much as, if not more than, the constitutionality of officer conduct.'
1 87
But it does not have to be this way. Copwatchers invoke the Constitution
even as they contest police practices beyond its reach. 188 Through their
183. Balkin, supra note 69, at 28; see also Martha Minow, Law and Social Change, 62 UMKC
L. REV. 171, 176 (1993) ("Law... is not merely the formal official rules adopted by legislatures,
courts and executives nor solely the procedures of those institutions. Law is also the practices of
governance and resistance people develop behind and beyond the public institutions. Those practices
may alter formal, public law; they also alter the meaning and shape of law and provide a potentially
rich context for social change.").
184. Guinier & Torres, supra note 17, at 2781.
185. See Jeremy Perelman & Lucie E. White, Stones of Hope: Experience and Theory in
African Economic and Social Rights Activism, in STONES OF HOPE: How AFRICAN AcTIVISTS
RECLAIM HuMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY 149, 154 (Lucie E. White & Jeremy
Perelman eds., 2011) ("[P]erformances can sometimes disrupt or reverse entrenched power
hierarchies," especially when "moments of power reversal get remembered and retold in ways that
sustain their politicizing effect over time.").
186. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996); see also Bowers, supra note 39, at 992-95; Harmon, supra note 14,
at 768-81; Sekhon, supra note 39, at 1179-81.
187. See Meares, supra note 6; Schulhofer et al., supra note 120, at 350-62; Tyler et al., supra
note 29.
188. Cf Wasserman, supra note 12, at 646 ("[R]egardless of how policy[ ]makers themselves
interpret and understand the video, they must consider whether the public or some subcommunity
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presence, they ask that officers consider the experience of residents of entire
neighborhoods with respect to their practices. They ask that police officers
consider the dignity of those residents. They bring issues of race and class to
the forefront. And they do all of this through an adversarial stance from a group
of people who care deeply about the neighborhood. Indeed, it is the adversarial
nature of copwatching-the ability of copwatchers to contest police practices in
the moment-that gives the practice the potential to change legal meaning.'
1 89
III.
THE LIMITS OF COPWATCHING
If the above description seems rosy, it should not imply that copwatching
is all roses. To the contrary, it is messy and diffuse. And it carries with it a
series of risks-including the risks of intruding on others' privacy interests and
of relying too heavily on the medium of video. I discuss these limits of the
practice below. I begin by addressing the widespread police resistance to being
filmed, and in particular to organized copwatching, asking whether it represents
a fatal impediment to the success of copwatching as a form of police
accountability. My conclusion is a qualified no: police resistance does not
mean that organized copwatching is a futile enterprise, but does demonstrate
the limits of organized copwatching as any full "solution" to filling gaps in
accountability between police and civilians.
A. Police Resistance
Police officers often resist being filmed by civilians, whether those
civilians are casual bystanders or organized copwatchers. This resistance plays
out in a number of ways-most visibly, in the arrest of individuals who are
filming the police.190 In some jurisdictions, the First Amendment clearly
protects the observation and open filming of police officers when doing so does
not physically interfere with the officers.' 91 However, in practice, officers do
(united by demographics, ideology, political concerns, or some combination) will see unconstitutional
behavior.").
189. See infra Part IV.
190. See Kreimer, supra note 7, at 357-64 (collecting cases); Daniel Denvir, The Legal Right
to Videotape Police Isn't Actually All that Clear, CITYLAB (Apr. 10, 2015),
http://www.citylab.com/crime/2015/04/the-legal-right-to-videotape-police-isnt-actually-all-
that-clear/390285/ [https://perma.cc/7FFQ-LHAA] (describing "widespread, continuing
pattern of law enforcement officers ordering people to stop taking photographs or video in
public places, and harassing, detaining and arresting those who fail to comply" (quoting
ACLU of South Carolina Legal Director Susan K. Dunn)).
191. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing the parameters
of the First Amendment right to record the police in public); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir.
2011) (same); cf Reynolds & Stealdey, supra note 12, at 1204 ("Though the issue has not yet reached
the Supreme Court, it seems safe to say that the case for First Amendment protection regarding photos
and video of law enforcement officers in public is quite strong, and is in the process of being
resolved."). In some jurisdictions, however, the First Amendment right to record is not yet "clearly
established"-or established at all. See infra note 271 (comparing cases). For a discussion of the
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not always recognize this distinction. In some states, police officers arrest
individuals for filming police in public under state wiretapping statutes 92-
although courts are increasingly finding these police practices
unconstitutional. 193 More commonly, police arrest copwatchers for charges that
can include failure to obey an officer, interference with police conduct,
harassment, and disorderly conduct.1 94 Some recorders report that their images
or videos have been erased after being seized by police officers. 195 Officers
have also arrested bystanders for failing to turn over cameras and images of
police conduct.1 96 This has led to a slew of lawsuits against police departments
for arresting individuals engaged in recording police conduct from a
distance, 197 many with organized copwatchers as named plaintiffs.19
8
Copwatching organizations vary in their experiences with respect to
police resistance. The groups report an array of police responses to their
conduct, ranging from respect and cooperation to systematic deployment of
officers to block cameras, shine lights into camera lenses, physically intimidate
current ambiguity surrounding the right to record in many jurisdictions, see Simonson, supra note 21,
at 2-4, 13-15.
192. See Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for Safeguards
in State Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian's Right to Record Public Police Activity, 9
FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 487, 533-45 (2013) (collecting wiretapping statutes).
193. See, e.g., Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (lst Cir. 2014); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679
F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
194. See Kreimer, supra note 7, at 361 ("Where wiretap prohibitions do not apply, officers
faced with defiant videographers frequently turn to broader criminal statutes that provide substantial
enforcement discretion."); Michael Potere, Note, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?: Citizens Recording
Police Conduct, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 273, 302-06 (2012) (collecting cases); Garry Reed, Orlando
CopWatch Activist Not Guilty, Goes to Jail Anyway, EXAMINER.COM (July 8, 2011),
http://www.examiner.com/article/orlando-copwatch-activist-not-guilty-goes-to-jaii-anyway
[http://perma.cc/5H8A-ENV3].
195. See Larry Krasner, Cellphone Videography as Spontaneous Protest, YoUTUBE (Apr. 25,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v--ybFkDTUuTp8 [http://perma.cc/FH47-FFWU] (showing
an officer confiscating cell phones after someone videotaped him beating a suspect); see also id. ("[It
is] very important to remember that they're going to go for your videos."); Potere, supra note 194, at
302-06 (collecting cases and describing a series of situations in which "police are... threatening
recorders at the scene, confiscating their cameras, arresting them, or... punishing them after the video
has been disseminated").
196. See, e.g., Sean Gardiner, The NYPD Harasses a Photographer at Coney Island, VILLAGE
VOICE (New York) (June 10, 2008), http://www.villagevoice.com/news/the-nypd-harasses-a-
photographer-at-coney-island-6428922 [https://perma.cc/RSQX-E2W9]; see also Kreimer, supra note
7, at 363-66 (describing "the 'crime' of photographic defiance of authority").
197. See, e.g., Jacob Sullum, D.C. Police Officially Declare Photography Is Not a Crime,
REASON.COM (July 23, 2012), http://reason.com/blog/2012/07/23/dc-police-officially-declare-
photography/print [http://perma.cc/ZU9Z-P2KG] (describing arrest of student-photographer Jerome
Vorus for filming the police in Washington, D.C.); see also Ray Sanchez, Growing Number of
Prosecutions for Videotaping the Police, ABC NEWS (July 19, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/TheLaw/videotaping-cops-arrest/story?id=l 1179076
[https://perma.cc/H4G8-32NK?type-image].
198. See infra notes 201-02(collecting cases).
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copwatchers, and arrest individuals for filming.' 99  Some copwatching
organizations, for instance, report experiencing little resistance from police
officers.200 At the other end of the spectrum, at least two organizations have
experienced a pattern of what they believe to be retaliation against their group
for their filming and posting of videos-in both cases lawsuits are pending
against the individual officers and the police departments. 20 1 And in more than
one case, lawsuits from individual copwatchers against police officers for
interfering with filming in public have led to formal changes in police
department policies. 202 Police officer resistance to copwatching can have a
chilling effect on groups who would like to engage in the practice. For
instance, one group representative with whom I spoke explained that her group
engaged in a pilot copwatching practice for six months, but stopped, in part, out
of concerns for the safety of the participants.0 3
199. See, e.g., BERKELEY COPWATCH, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF COPWATCHING: REPORT ON
STATE VIOLENCE, POLICE REPRESSION AND ATTACKS ON DIRECT MONITORING 6 (2011),
http://berkeleycopwatch.org/resources/Criminalization-of Copwatching_2011 .pdf
[https://perma.cciWG9M-9RMZ]. The report collects experiences of copwatching organizations who
have seen resistance from police officers and states that "[t]he most common tactic encountered was
police officers lying to their detainee by saying that the Copwatchers would post video online to
humiliate those being detained. The detainees would then ask for the Copwatchers to stop filming.
Along similar lines, police often shine their lights in the direction of those filming to make it
impossible to focus the cameras." Id. LA CAN Interview, supra note 89. LA CAN reported
experiencing "everything from blocking cameras to intimidating members on watch to targeting and
arresting folks to pretty trumped up charges. It started pretty quickly--the harassment and trying to
stop filming started like six months in after we started getting some media attention and built in
intensity over time." Id.
200. Indeed, one organization representative reported that he started the organization so as to try
to be more respectful toward police when holding them accountable, and that he had found that respect
returned. As he explained, "Honestly one of the reasons [we are] doing [copwatching] is that I've
always hated the 'f*** the police' people." See Telephone Interview by Sophie Gebreselassie with
Tucson Ariz. Copblock (July 29, 2014). In turn, the same representative reported that some officers
have told members "that videoing allows people to trust the police." Id
201. See Buehler v. City of Austin, No. A-13-CV-1100 ML (W.D. Tex. July 24, 2014)
(denying city's motion to dismiss claim that Austin police officers unlawfully targeted the founder of
Peaceful Streets-Austin when he was engaged in a group patrol to record officers at traffic stops);
Complaint, Cangress v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV14-1743 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2014) (describing
retaliatory conduct against LA CAN's community watch program).
202. See, e.g., METRO. POLICE, D.C., GENERAL ORDER NO. 304-19, VIDEO RECORDING,
PHOTOGRAPHING, AND AUDIO RECORDING OF METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT MEMBERS BY
THE PUBLIC (July 19, 2012), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/go_304 19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U2WC-H5NW] (police recognizing the right of individuals to film the police, issued
as part of a settlement with Jerome Vorus); Nathan Diebenow, Atlanta Police Agreed to Back Off
Citizens Who Videotape, RAW STORY (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/02/14
/atlanta-police-agreed-to-back-off-citizens-who-videotape/ [http://perma.cc/3M4L-TX7L] (describing
settlement of lawsuit by member of East Atlanta Copwatch for confiscating his camera phone, which
settlement included a revision to the Atlanta Police Department's policies regarding the filming by
civilians of officers on duty).
203. Telephone Interview with Copwatch Providence (Mar. 24, 2014). This organization
engaged in copwatching for six months in 2011 but is now defunct. Copwatch Providence, Minutes
from Pilot Project Wrap-Up Meeting (Aug. 3,2011) (on file with author).
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Why might well-meaning officers resist being filmed? 2° 4 Some may be
concerned about safety. For example, in the wake of Eric Garner's death,
Police Commissioner William Bratton implied that the filming by bystanders of
Garner's arrest may have contributed to the police conduct, telling reporters
that the filming of police officers by onlookers is "interference [that] certainly
exacerbates the situation, raising the officers' tension... that is of concern., 20 5
Bratton emphasized that the filming of officers can make it harder for those
officers to apprehend suspects in a peaceful manner.20 6 Police leaders from
across the country have echoed similar concerns.20 7 But while concern for
officer safety might explain disapproval of filming extremely close to an
officer, it does not fully explain officer resistance-after all, it is just as
plausible that someone stopped by the police would behave less violently
knowing that they are on camera.208 Indeed, the Department of Justice has
argued that protecting the right to film police officers promotes rather than
impedes officer safety.
209
Beyond a concern with officer safety, officers may resist copwatching
because they experience it as a form of disrespect. Studies demonstrate that
disrespect or perceived disrespect for the police makes officers more likely to
204. Not all officers, of course, are well-meaning. Certainly for some, it may be because they
intend to engage in conduct they know to be unlawful or unsavory. One recent video in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, for instance, reveals an officer pushed a suspect to the ground with several onlookers
gathered around him, and then turned only to the person with the camera and attempted to confiscate
his camera and arrest him. See Carlos Miller, Pennsylvania Cops Single Out Man with Camera,
Ordering Him Away from Police Abuse Incident, PINAC (July 29, 2014),
http://photographyisnotacrime.com/2014/07/29/pennsylvania-cops-single-man-camera-ordering-away-
police-abuse-incident/ [http://perma.cc/NS4J-ZNDL].
205. Anthony M. DeStefano, NYPD Commissioner Bratton: Interfering with Arrests Makes It
Harder for Cops to Nab Suspects, NEWSDAY (July 28, 2014), http://www.newsday.com/news/new-
york/nypd-commissioner-bratton-interfering-with-arrests-makes-it-harder-for-cops-t-nabsuspects-
1.8910655 [http://perma.cc/J5YW-SGDT] (quoting Commissioner Bratton). Although a prolonged
discussion of this comment from Commissioner Bratton goes too far afield of my point here, it bears
mentioning that in this case, the individual filming the arrest, chokehold, and death of Mr. Garner
never came physically near the officers nor did he speak to them. Id.
206. Id Some officers also claim that they confiscate cell phones because they look like guns.
See M Camera is a Weapon, But It's Not a Gun Stupid, WECOPWATCH (May 25, 2013),
http://wecopwatch.org/my-camera-is-a-weapon-but-its-not-a-gun-stupid/ [http://perma.cc/A9V3-
ZUSA].
207. See, e.g., Matt Stout, Boston Police Commissioner Wants Law to Push Back on Camera-
Toting Cop Watchers, BOS. HERALD (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.bostonherald.com/news_opinion
/localcoverage/2015/08/bostonpolice commissionerwantslaw tojpush back on camera
[https://perma.cc/2DPH-NBEL]; Alysia Santo, Why Cops Aren't Ready for Their Close-Up,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/24/why-cops-aren-
t-ready-for-their-close-up [https://perma.cc/BJ8L-D58A] (interviewing Dallas Police Association
President Ron Pinkston).
208. Cf Carroll, supra note 112 (describing a study showing that police behave better when
being filmed).
209. See Letter from Jonathan M. Smith, Chief, Special Litig. Section, Civil Rights Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice to Mark H. Grimes, Office of Legal Affairs, Balt. Police Dep't (May 14, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spldocuments/Sharpltr 5-14-12.pdf[http://perma.cc/BB53-SHDB].
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decide to arrest someone.2l No matter how politely a bystander speaks to
them, a police officer may feel that a camera focused on them while they work
is a challenge to their authority21 ' and to their expertise. 212 In the words of FBI
Director James Comey, officers feel attacked--"under siege"-when cell
phones are pointed at them. 213 In many ways, the adversarial dimension of
copwatching invites this type of resistance because it aims to transfer power
from State actors to civilians by asking that those State actors-police
officers-relinquish some power and authority to the people whom they serve.
Copwatchers remind police officers that they are accountable to more than
their supervising officers and elected officials-that there is also a public
whom they serve and which includes those very people observing them.214 As
the Supreme Court has stated in the context of verbal altercations with police
officers, "[t]he freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police
action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by
which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.,, 215 As I will argue in
Part V, to the extent that the police resist filming from a respectful distance, it
210. See TOCH, supra note 112, at 45-50 (collecting police officers' statements regarding their
reactions to perceived disrespect from spectators); Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests: Surveillance
Evasion and Fourth Amendment Suspicion, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 997, 1021 (2013) (collecting studies and
stating that "[s]ociologists have repeatedly demonstrated that perceived disrespect for the police is an
important-indeed perhaps the primary-factor in determining the degree to which police interfere
with an individual's liberty").
211. One journalist describes this police reaction in this way: "When the police act as though
cameras were the equivalent of guns pointed at them, there is a sense in which they are correct.
Cameras have become the most effective weapon that ordinary people have to protect against and to
expose police abuse." Kyle VanHemert, Are Cameras the New Guns?, GIZMODO (June 2, 2010),
http://gizmodo.com/5553765/are-cameras-the-new-guns [http://perma.cc/8PEE-NZYX].
212. See HERBERT, supra note 31, at 67 (concluding based on interviews with officers that
many police officers view themselves "as members of a politically embattled institution whose unique
base of expertise needs protection from the uninformed meddling of biased community activists").
213. James B. Comey, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the University of
Chicago School of Law (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/law-enforcement-and-
the-communities-we-serve-bending-the-lines-toward-safety-and-justice [https://perma.cc/C23U-
MHJ4].
214. Copwatching may also give some support to officers who do not like the way that their
fellow officers treat people. Just like residents of a neighborhood, police officers within a department
do not think as one-especially now that many urban police departments are diverse along lines of
race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality. Cf SKLANSKY, supra note 6, at 147-51. For officers who
disagree with their department's treatment of particular populations or neighborhoods, it is possible
that copwatching opens up the space for these officers to have a voice within their department. See,
e.g., id. at 150 (describing how minority officer organizations frequently work with minority groups
outside of the police departments); CUAPB Interview, supra note 100 (describing how some police
officers and retired police officers support their efforts); cf BLEA USA, Black Law Enforcement
Organziations [sic] Denounce NYPD Commissioner Bratton, YOUTUBE (July 30, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-xsnBF4Tx8 [http://perma.cc/77NZ-2UBR] (video of press
conference in which Black Law Enforcement Organizations denounce policy of broken windows
policing in New York City).
215. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,462-63 (1987).
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is the job of courts, the Department of Justice, and police departments
themselves to discourage this resistance.
B. Privacy Concerns
Organized copwatching may also intrude on the privacy interests of third
parties and those under arrest. People may not like being filmed, no matter
what they are doing.21 6 As scholars of privacy have argued, surveillance can
have a chilling effect on how people speak and write, both in traditionally
private areas and in the public sphere. 217 In particular, if copwatching groups
are expressing disapproval of policing policies while holding cameras, this may
discourage people who agree with police actions from voicing their opinions. If
people filming officers are expressing appreciation for a specific police action,
the reverse may be true. Some copwatching groups mitigate these privacy risks
by asking the person interacting with the officer for permission to film them
and then permission to post any film.
218
Filming by copwatchers may also discourage individuals from helping
police officers gather information and solve crimes. This is the central concern
of Judge Richard Posner, who dissented from a Seventh Circuit decision
recognizing a First Amendment right to film officers in public.2 19 Posner
worries that filming in public can "impair the ability of police both to extract
information relevant to police duties and to communicate effectively with
persons whom they speak with in the line of duty.' ,220 He gives the example of
a police officer who meets with an informant on a park bench-the risk that
they may be filmed and that information distributed can discourage the
cooperation of that informant.2 2 ' This concern, however, may not be as
alarming as Judge Posner suggests. Police officers live in a world where their
actions may always be on video-from government surveillance cameras,
private surveillance cameras, and individual recorders alike. 222 And people who
want to cooperate with police officers, too, know that it may not be wise to do
so on the open road or street. But there are real privacy concerns here that
216. See DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 190-91 (2007) (describing
"varieties of surveillance experience"); Joh, supra note 210, at 1012 ("[Some] individuals object to the
growing presence of surveillance in their lives no matter whether it comes from public or private
entities."); Richards, supra note 124, at 1945-52 (discussing the dangers of surveillance to
"intellectual privacy").
217. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 181, 199-200 (2008); Richards, supra note 124, at 1937-42.
218. See, e.g., Berkeley Copwatch Interview, supra note 171 (describing practice of asking for
permission before filming and consulting a lawyer before posting any material).
219. ACLU of lll. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 611 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting).
220. Id.
221. Id. at613.
222. See Capers, supra note 109, at 960-65; Joh, supra note 210, at 1018-22; Richards, supra
note 124, at 1937-42.
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underscore the limited ability of copwatching groups to "represent" any
neighborhood or community.
C. The Ambiguity of Video
Finally, there is a limit to how far video can go in leading to change
within police departments. First, concentrating on videos of specific acts by
individual officers can further a focus on "bad cops," rather than the
institutional dynamics that guide police behavior. 223 Conflating the behavior of
individuals with the workings of larger institutions can leave institutional
224problems in place and larger power dynamics unchanged. Videos are
anecdotal-they cannot replace the comprehensive data collection and
empirical work needed for courts, legislators, and agencies to regulate the
police effectively.
Second, the medium of video presents its own limitations. Although video
can seem objective, how a viewer interprets a video depends on the narratives
225 226
structuring that video, how it is framed,226  and the biases 7  and
experiences 228 of the viewer. The different interpretations that two different
juries drew from the video of the beating of Rodney King is a classic example
of this: the two juries, drawn from different counties, received different
narratives and edits of the video and came to different conclusions about the
police officers' behavior.229 More recently, polls show that a majority of
Americans, as well as a majority of New Yorkers, disagree with the decision of
a New York City grand jury to decline to indict Officer Daniel Pantaleo in the
223. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 453, 455 (2004) ("[R]eform efforts have focused too much on notorious incidents and
misbehaving individuals, and too little on an overly aggressive police culture that facilitates and
rewards violent conduct.").
224. See Cohen, supra note 217, at 199-200 ("As political performance art, sousveillance is
brilliant.... [Blut sousveillance does not change the architectural conditions of surveillance or the
underlying inequalities that they reinforce."); Torin Monahan, Counter-surveillance as Political
Intervention?, 16 SOC. SEMIOTICS 515, 515 (2006) ("[C]urrent modes of activism tend to individualize
surveillance problems and methods of resistance, leaving the institutions, policies, and cultural
assumptions that support public surveillance relatively insulated from attack.").
225. See Kahan et al., Protest, supra note 141, at 883-84 (describing a study testing motivated
cognition and its effects on viewers); Kahan et al., Whose Eyes, supra note 141, at 879-81.
226. See Benforado, supra note 137, at 1347-60 (exploring the importance of framing and
point of view for observers).
227. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1160-61
(2012) (describing how the availability of video evidence may actually increase the impact of implicit
bias, as viewers feel they have license when looking at objective video to make judgments).
228. See Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 141, at 881-902 (describing the varying
perspectives behind a finding of legitimacy in the Scott decision).
229. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, 70 DENVER U. L. REV.
283, 285-86 (1993) (describing how the video of the beating of Rodney King was both physically and
symbolically mediated during the civil trial of the officers, changing an unambiguous video to
"ambiguous slices of time in a tense moment that Rodney King created for the police"); Stuart, supra
note 92, at 330-33 (describing the social construction of video in the Rodney King trial).
2016]
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
death of Eric Garner despite a video of the incident-evidence that
interpretations of the video vary greatly.230 In a series of recent studies,
Professor Dan Kahan and his coauthors have demonstrated that individuals
perceive videos of police conduct differently depending on their backgrounds,
experiences, and political beliefs.231  Similarly, people from different
backgrounds and with different views of policing in their neighborhoods will
have very different reactions to video of copwatchers engaging with police
officers.
Moreover, it can be difficult for copwatchers, no matter how organized, to
control the narratives of their videos. Sociologist Forrest Stuart details this
difficulty in his ethnography of the LA CAN Community Watch's attempt to
document police actions toward the homeless on Skid Row in Los Angeles.232
Although the Skid Row residents engaged in dialogue with officers on video in
an effort to document those officers' training and intentions in a particular
moment, police officers also engaged in counterstrategies on video that served
to undermine the credibility of the copwatchers themselves. For example,
police referred to the political tattoo of someone holding the camera.
233
Analyzing this phenomenon, Stuart worries that certain police responses to
being filmed "may ... actually lead to an increase in police ability to present
and defend their own interpretations.
'
"
234
These are legitimate concerns facing groups seeking change through the
medium of video. But copwatching organizations do more than capture
videos-they look beyond individual videos as the answer to any one problem
and instead seek a broader approach to changing the status quo through, among
other tactics, the power transfer entailed in group observation and filming.
Video can help in these efforts by not only deterring misconduct, but also by
providing more data points, more perspectives, and less opportunity for police
officials to dominate the conversation over what policing can and should be.
235
230. See Ariel Edwards-Levy, Most Americans, Black and White, Disapprove of Lack of
Charges in Eric Garner Case, HUFFTNGTON POST (Dec. 9, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/09/eric-garner-poll1n_6295872.html [http://perma.cc/Y3G2-
UPYN]; Anna Sanders, Poll Finds Most New Yorkers Oppose Eric Garner Grand Jury Decision,
SLIvE.COM (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2014/12/ericgamergrand
jury_poll.html [http://perma.cc/ZT9N-Q8TQ].
231. Kahan et al., Protest, supra note 141, at 883-84; Kahan et al., Whose Eyes, supra note
141, at 879-81 (2009) (studying perceptions of video of police officers driving a car offthe road).
232. See Stuart, supra note 92, at 335-36.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 343.
235. Cf DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 31 (1998) ("Cameras don't have imaginations.... In
fact, when their fields of view overlap, we can use them to check on each other. Especially if a wide
range of people do the viewing and controlling.").
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For copwatching, video is a form of advocacy as much as it is a form of
documenting the truth.236
IV.
BEYOND CONSENSUS
Copwatching may not be perfect, but it can nevertheless be a productive
and provocative form of participation in criminal justice. In a given
neighborhood, it may represent one point of view among many. But it is a point
of view often left out of efforts to solicit public input into policing practices. To
recognize that copwatching has a place-not as a panacea, but as a piece of the
puzzle-changes the scholarly conversation about lay participation in policing.
It means that part of being serious about public participation, especially from
disempowered populations, is creating the conditions for the disempowered to
participate in their own ways outside of formal institutions and procedures. In
the focus on consensus-driven mechanisms that seek partnerships between
police officers and community members to identify policing priorities, 237 there
is a danger of losing sight of the value of more adversarial methods of
engagement.
Copwatching organizations take a clearly adversarial stance toward police
officers in their neighborhoods when they take out their cameras. This
adversarialism itself has a use. The control of copwatchers over their own
actions, recordings, and participation in formal institutions turns the tables on
the traditional control that officers have to dictate the terms of public
participation.238 This power shift promotes democratic engagement so that
other forms of accountability-legislative, executive, and administrative, both
federal and local-can more accurately represent the people to whom they are
supposed to be accountable.
In its ideal form, organized copwatching displays a faith in both the
Constitution and political engagement. This faith takes the shape of a
confrontational practice that seeks change through a combination of official
and grassroots channels, through both law and politics. However, although
organized copwatching is adversarial, it need not be antagonistic. To the
contrary, copwatching in its most productive form is what political theorist
Chantal Mouffe would call agonistic.
239
Agonism takes an adversarial stance toward practices and ideologies of
institutions in power, but it does so through engagement with those institutions
236. See Gillian Caldwell, Using Video for Advocacy, in VIDEO FOR CHANGE: A GUIDE FOR
ADVOCACY AND AcTIvIsM, supra note 81, at 1-19 (describing contemporaneous recording of human
rights violations as a form of advocacy); cf Austin, supra note 77, at 847-49 (describing the concept
of "visual legal advocacy" through film).
237. See generally Skogan & Roth, supra note 41, at xvii.
238. See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
239. See generally CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 80-105 (2000)
[hereinafter MOUFFE, PARADOX]; MOUFFE, supra note 13, at 1-19.
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rather than withdrawal, by acknowledging intractable differences but
respecting the adversary who disagrees. 24° Agonism serves as a contrast to, on
one end, antagonism, through which groups withdraw from political
institutions altogether, 241 and on the other end, deliberation, which emphasizes
consensus through rational dialogue. 242 Because no one idea can be
representative of a diverse modem population, "[t]oo much emphasis on
consensus, together with aversion toward confrontations, leads to apathy and to
a disaffection with political participation., 243 Agonism thus pushes up against
the exclusion that can come from avoiding conflict through consensus, but
maintains that change can come through contestation that engages with formal
democratic processes. 244 Although there are other democratic theories that
critique the deliberative turn toward consensus through dialogue, 245 the concept
of agonism is useful in its ability to discern different kinds of non-consensus-
based strategies for change.
In particular, the distinction between agonism and antagonism is a useful
way to draw out some of the differences in how various copwatching
organizations approach legal change. A minority of groups with which I
spoke-five of eighteen-are not agonistic but rather antagonistic: they
withdraw from participation in formal institutions, often identifying with
246
anarchist forms of communal governing. In contrast, the majority of groups
240. MOUFFE, PARADOX, supra note 239, at 100-05.
241. Id. at 102.
242. Id. at 90-98 (citing JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMs 127 (1996)).
243. MOUFFE, supra note 13, at 7.
244. Legal scholars have used Mouffe's concept of agonism to argue for the benefits of various
forms of contestation in the legal world. See, e.g., Bernadette Meyler, Accepting Contested Meanings,
82 FORDHAM L. REv. 803, 826 (2013) (discussing adversarial debates around the initial writing of the
Constitution, discussing contestation of the interpretation of the Constitution by social movements, and
stating that "social movements' work to affect constitutional interpretation has brought such agonism
to the fore today"); Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post's and Meiklejohn's
Mistakes: The Central Role ofAdversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1303, 1361 (2009) (discussing an adversarial conception of the First Amendment); cf Robert
Post, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the Relationship Between Law and Politics, 98 CALIF.
L. REV. 1319, 1336-40 (2010) (discussing Mouffe's concept of agonism in the context of other
theorists who acknowledge the need for disagreement in politics).
245. See, e.g., JEFFREY EDWARD GREEN, THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE: DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE
OF SPECTATORSHIP 58-63 (2010) (putting forth a "vocal model of popular empowerment" in contrast
to the model of deliberative democracy); PHILIP PETnIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN
THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 5-26 (2012) (describing contrast between republicanism and
deliberative democracy); SHAPIRO, supra note 71, at 10-50 (discussing the limits of deliberative
democracy in preventing domination by the most powerful); IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND
DEMOCRACY 36-51 (2000) (critiquing deliberative democracy for privileging civil discourse over
disruptive political practices); see also SKLANSKY, supra note 6, at 59-105 (laying out the contrast
between pluralist conceptions of democracy and those of deliberative democracy and connecting that
distinction to similar distinctions in policing policy).
246. See, e.g., Copwatch LA Interview, supra note 171 (mission statement includes "fighting
for change without a reformist consciousness"); Copwatch of East Atlanta Interview, supra note 101
(describing roots of organization in the "anarchist" tradition); PSP Austin Interview, supra note 96
(describing their deliberate decision to divorce themselves from political activity). Mouffe
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with which I spoke follow an agonistic model. They actively contest police
officers' individual actions and express profound, at times complete,
disagreement with the practices and priorities of their local police departments.
They seek to shift power from police officers to the populations that they
police. But they do so through civic engagement with the processes in place-
they make sure that their actions comport with First Amendment protections
for filming in public; they solicit the support of public officials and join in local
lobbying efforts; they participate in lawsuits and seek institutional reform of
police departments; and they attend community policing meetings and attempt
to join local conversations about policing priorities. This engagement with
formal institutions may lie at the periphery of a copwatching organization's
work, but nevertheless demonstrates the agonistic nature of much of the
practice.
When a copwatching group takes an agonistic stance toward local police
practices, it seeks both power and participation. In this way, an agonistic
practice of copwatching falls somewhere between what Professor Heather
Gerken calls "dissenting by deciding," where political minorities make a
decision from within a formal state process such as a jury or a school board,24 7
and "civil disobedience," where dissenters purposefully disobey an existing law
in an effort to change law or policy. 248 Agonistic copwatching acknowledges
and celebrates profound disagreement with current policing practices but works
to change those practices through contestation both within and outside of
official channels.
Copwatching challenges leading accounts of community participation in
policing that eschew the adversarial in all forms, whether agonistic or
antagonistic. 249 Copwatching challenges, too, the tendency to group the
"community" as a force in opposition to all arrestees and defendants, and,
therefore, in opposition to individual constitutional rights.250 In this way,
copwatching also presents a challenge to a local police department's claim to
represent "the people" by removing from the street or the road those who the
police decide have violated community norms. Copwatching reveals that
individual rights and community interests are not always at odds; it depends,
rather, on how you define "community."
Scholars who are worried about the wide scale civic disengagement and
disenfranchisement of people who live in highly policed neighborhoods should
characterizes "withdrawal from" political institutions as the central indication of an antagonistic
approach to politics. See MOUFFE, supra note 13, at 65-84.
247. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1745, 1748 (2005).
248. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 320 (rev. ed. 1999) (defining civil disobedience
as a "public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of
bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government").
249. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., MEARES & KAHAN, supra note 15, at 8-11 (arguing that there is a conflict
between democratic rule and individual rights with respect to the policing of minority communities).
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be excited about both the performative and pragmatic dimensions of agonistic
copwatching. As a complement to initiatives that seek participation through
deliberation, lay-driven forms of police accountability can serve as a partial
anecdote to the danger of co-optation by government-driven collaborative
approaches. For example, copwatching can work in tandem with the
creation of formal mechanisms of engagement such as community policing and
its outgrowths. Indeed, some recent proposals for new consensus-based reforms
are promising: we would do well to solicit ongoing local feedback into official
police policies, whether through court-supervised consent decrees, 251 the
convening of juries,252 or the solicitation of public comments regarding police
253procedures prior to their implementation. But we should also respect the
inherent conflict that comes when we ask a policed "community" to tell us
what they think about local policing-we should respect the agonism displayed
by much organized copwatching.
V.
RESPECTING OBSERVATION
What does it mean for courts, legislatures, executives, and police officers
themselves to respect copwatching? Given the widespread resistance of police
officers to being recorded, this is no small feat. It requires both internal and
external pressures, both constitutional and extraconstitutional change. And it
requires that scholars and reformers respect processes of accountability that
originate outside of elite-dominated systems and debates.
A. Structural Reform of Police Departments
Police departments, executives, legislatures, and courts alike should
realize that promoting respect for observation and filming is an important part
of police accountability-one that can complement other forms of soliciting
public input into policing practices. In the last two decades, much large-scale
reform of police departments has happened through 42 U.S.C. § 14141, also
known as the Police Misconduct Statute, which gives the Department of Justice
the power to pursue structural reform litigation against police departments
engaged in a pattern or practice of misconduct.25 4 Consent decrees that emerge
251. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 58, at 101-05; Sabel & Simon, supra note 58, at 1047;
Simmons, supra note 58, at 396-419.
252. See, e.g., Luna, supra note 67, at 840; Ryan, supra note 67, at 891-94.
253. See, e.g., BIBAS, supra note 32, at 149-50 (proposing the solicitation of online feedback
about policing priorities); Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 55, at 39-53 (proposing notice-and-
comment procedures for policing and prosecutorial charging policies); Friedman & Ponomarenko,
supra note 28, at 1879-81 (discussing benefits of public participation in rule-making surrounding
police procedures).
254. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012); see also Harmon, supra note 59, at 11 (describing the origins of
section 14141); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99
MINN. L. REV. 1343 (2015).
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from § 14141 litigation allow courts to oversee the restructuring of police
policies and procedures through ongoing monitoring and data collection.
255
Those consent decrees, however, rarely focus on respecting observation and
filming of police as part of their solution-only three of twenty-eight federal
settlements, consent decrees, and memoranda of agreement signed between the
Department of Justice and local police departments in the last two decades
include provisions relating to the First Amendment right to observe or record in
public. 256 Police departments, executives, and courts alike should realize that
promoting respect for observation and filming is a necessary part of true police
accountability.
To promote respect for observation, police departments must focus on
what policing expert Samuel Walker refers to as "PTSR"-Policy, Training,
Supervision, and Review-the four pillars necessary for true police reform.
25 7
This begins with changes to written police policies, or "general orders. ,258 A
number of police departments have issued explicit orders or policies stating
that it is not a crime to film police officers in public, many of them following
well-publicized incidents of interference with cameras. 259 The Department of
255. Rushin, supra note 254.
256. These are the settlements between the Department of Justice and the cities of East Haven,
Seattle, and New Orleans. See Settlement Agreement and Order, United States v. Town of East Haven,
No. 3:12-cv-01652, (D. Conn. Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents
/ehpdsettle 11-20-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/NTT9-66UC]; Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans
Police Department, United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:12-cv-01924 (E.D. La. July 24, 2012),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-LA-0001-0001 .pdf [https://perma.cc/8VGV-5XET]
[hereinafter New Orleans Consent Decree]; Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Order of Resolution,
United States v. Seattle, No. 2:12-cv-01282 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/sp1documents/spd consentdecree_7-27-12.pdf
[http://perma.cc/E7VR-Q6TK]; cf Rushin, supra note 254, at 1378-88 (detailing content of multiple
settlement agreements).
257. See SAM WALKER, RESPONDING TO THE NYPD CHOKEHOLD DEATH: A PTSR
FRAMEWORK 1 (2014), http://samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/RESPONDING-TO-
TI{E-NYPD-CHOKEHOLD-DEATH22.pdf [http://perma.cc/N485-LBGV] (describing the PTSR
framework of 'Policy, Training, Supervision, and Review" and explaining that "[e]ach element needs
to be in place in order to achieve genuine officer accountability").
258. See Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, in POLICE REFORM FROM THE BOTTOM UP:
OFFICERS AND THEIR UNIONS AS AGENTS OF CHANGE 144, 147 (Monique Marks & David Sklansky
eds., 2012) ("To a degree many outsiders find hard to fathom, little is supposed to happen in police
departments without General Orders detailing how it is to be done.").
259. See, e.g., CITY OF SEATTLE, SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL § 5.160 (June 6,
2008), http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/manual/05 160 CitizenObservationOfficers.html
[http://perma.ec/KB57-X2X2]; Timothy B. Lee, DC Police Chief Announces Shockingly Reasonable
Cell Camera Policy, ARS TECHNICA (July 24, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/07/dc-
police-chief-announces-shockingly-reasonable-cell-camera-policy/ [http://perma.cc/YZ8H-CKHC];
Boston Herald Staff, By the Book. What Police Should-and Shouldn't-Do, BOS. HERALD (Aug. 9,
2015), http://www.bostonherald.com/newsopinion/local coverage/2015/08/bythe_bookwhat
_police should and shouldn_t-do [https://perma.cc/L4A2-MWNX] (collecting police regulations
regarding civilian filming from Cambridge, Chelsea, and Boston, Massachusetts).
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Justice has supported these regulations. 260 Regulations making clear that
filming an officer is not a crime, however, do not eliminate police resistance on
their own. In Washington, D.C., for example, an officer arrested someone for
filming just one day after his police department issued a formal-and well-
publicized-regulation regarding the filming of the police.
261
As much as police departments are starting to realize the importance of
respecting cameras, incidents of bad reactions to filming police continue
without substantial training and supervision underscoring those policies. 262 As
scholars and reformers have documented, the actions of police officers often
conform less to the formal rules and practices "on the books" than to "a
different set of rules--embodied in informal norms and operational practices
263[that] actually govern[] the day-to-day conduct" of officers. Police training
can make a difference in changing these norms, as can leadership from
supervisors and administrators emphasizing the importance of respecting
filming.
264
These policies would be further aided by inclusion in § 14141 structural
reform litigation, whose monitoring mechanisms can add the "review" portion
of PTSR necessary to make police reform stick. The three federal consent
decrees that have referenced a right to record thus far-in East Haven, Seattle,
and New Orleans-have included provisions explicitly mandating training
regarding the right to film and observe. The New Orleans consent decree
further requires that "NOPD shall ensure that officers understand that
exercising this right serves important public purposes. 265 These provisions are
missing, however, in the vast majority of federal settlements and consent
decrees. Although ongoing monitoring need not require federal intervention-it
can also be done through independent police auditors put in place by
260. See, e.g., Letter from Jonathan M. Smith, supra note 209 (stating that the right to record
"subject to narrowly-defined restrictions, engender[s] public confidence in our police departments,
promote[s] public access to information necessary to hold our governmental officers accountable, and
ensure[s] public and officer safety").
261. See Carlos Miller, DC Cops Confiscate Phone, Steal Memory Card, Day After New Photo
Policy Implemented, PINAC (July 26, 2012), https://photographyisnotacrime.com/2012/07/dc-cops-
confiscate-phone-steal-memory-card-day-after-new-photo-policy-implemented/
[http://perma.cc/4XR8-GU47]; see also Andrew Rosado Shaw, Note, Our Duty in Light of the Law's
Irrelevance: Police Brutality and Civilian Recordings, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 161, 166-
80 (2012) ("Even in jurisdictions that unequivocally provide for legal surveillance of police, officers
have displayed a willingness to prevent or destroy the resulting evidence and to arrest the civilians
behind cameras on other frivolous charges.").
262. Cf Skogan, supra note 258, at 144-54.
263. Armacost, supra note 223, at 523-24; see also Samuel Walker, Institutionalizing Police
Accountability Reforms: The Problem of Making Police Reforms Endure, 32 ST. Louis U. PuB. L.
REV. 57, 68-71 (2012) (describing the resistance of police subculture to reforms).
264. See David Klinger, Can Police Training Affect the Use of Force on the Streets? The
Metro-Dade Violence Reduction Field Experiment, in HOLDING POLICE ACCOUNTABLE 95, 103-06
(Candace McCoy ed., 2010) (finding that training on use of violence reduces the use of force).
265. New Orleans Consent Decree, supra note 256, at V.E. 155.
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legislators 266-the Department of Justice has a chance here to lead the way
toward police respect for observation.
State legislation can also aid in the protection of civilians who record the
police. Two states--Colorado and California-passed laws in the first half of
2015 that reiterate the right of civilians to film the police; Colorado's law also
creates civil liability for officers who interfere with that right.267 Although civil
liability may not on its own deter officers from interfering with civilian
268filming, state legislation can send a forceful and important message to local
police departments regarding the necessity of respecting observation and
filming.269
B. Constitutional Change
Taking copwatching seriously goes beyond departmental policies that
require police officers to respect residents who film them. It also means that
proponents of improved accountability in policing should not give up on the
possibility of constitutional change. Constitutional change should happen in
two ways-first, by protecting the right to copwatch through the First
Amendment; and second, by respecting the contributions of copwatching to
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.
First Amendment jurisprudence is well on its way to recognizing a right to
film police officers in public-the First and Seventh Circuits have recognized
the right and district courts around the country have followed suit.27° However,
this right is far from settled, and courts from other circuits have in recent years
been divided as to whether a right to record is "clearly established"-an
266. See Walker, supra note 263, at 84-90 (describing such efforts in Los Angeles, Denver, and
Omaha).
267. See H.B. 15-1290, 70th General Assemb., 1st Sess. (Colo. 2015),
http://www.statebillinfo.com/bills/bills/15/1290 enr.pdf [https://perna.cc/L536-8DE6 (signed May
20, 2015); S.B. 411, 2015-16 Regular Sess. (Cal. 2015),
http://openstates.org/ca/bills/20152016/SB4l1 / [https://perma.cc/44YJ-YQWQ] (signed into law Aug.
11, 2015). In contrast, some states have proposed legislation that would criminalize certain forms of
filming the police in public. See, e.g., Daniel Pdrez, Bill Restricting Rights of Citizens to Videotape
Police Introduced in Texas House, HOUSTON CHRON. (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://www.chron.com/news/politics/texas/article/Bill-restricting-rights-of-citizens-to-videotape-
6130903.php [https://penra.cc/QWK5-LUCD].
268. Cf Schwartz, supra note 107 (showing that police officers are usually indemnified from
damages when they lose civil lawsuits).
269. Cf Adler-Bell, supra note 190 (quoting the policy director of the Colorado ACLU as
saying that the purpose of the Colorado law is to "get the police departments to pay attention and train
police about what they are and aren't allowed to do").
270. See ACLU of ll. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597-98 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655
F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011); cf Smith v. City ofCumrning, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) ("The
First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public
property. ); Buehler v. City of Austin, No. A-13-CV-1100 ML (W.D. Tex. July 24, 2014)
(cataloguing district court decisions from around the country and finding a clearly established First
Amendment right to record).
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important standard for purposes of qualified immunity. 2 7 1 There are also a
number of outstanding issues in the First Amendment doctrine, including
whether the doctrine protects surreptitious recording, whether officers can seize
cameras from bystanders, and the point at which police officers are justified in
arresting someone who is filming them because they represent a danger to the
police or civilians. 272 The First Amendment protection for recording cannot
extend to all circumstances; there must be limits on physical proximity and
allowances in truly unsafe circumstances. But up to this point, courts
adjudicating First Amendment cases have neglected to recognize that the act of
pointing a smartphone at a police officer is itself an act of expression and of
resistance. Courts adjudicating First Amendment claims should recognize the
multifaceted benefits-to democracy, to accountability, and to the protection of
dissent-that accrue from the respect accorded to civilian observation and
recording.
273
Copwatching also provides a path through which to rethink the contours
of Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" with respect to police-citizen
encounters. Fourth Amendment scholars have put forth thoughtful and nuanced
suggestions for ways that courts should shift their determinations of
"reasonableness" so as to better map onto societal perceptions of what is
reasonable 274 and better account for the experiences of people of color who live
and work in neighborhoods with a high police presence.275 Surely judges do not
271. Compare, e.g., Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F. Supp. 3d 369, 380 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (finding right to record clearly established in a case involving journalist otherwise unconnected
to the recorded events), and Crago v. Leonard, No. 2:13-CV-531-TLN-EFB, 2014 WL 3849954, at *4
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 4435954 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9,
2014) (also finding right to record clearly established), with Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d
248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding no clearly established right to record during a traffic stop), Pluma v.
City of New York, No. 13 Civ.2017, 2015 WL 1623828, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) (finding right
to record is not clearly established), and Lawson v. Hilderbrand, No. 3:13-CV-00206, 2015 WL
753708, at *100 (D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2015) (same).
272. See Taylor Robertson, Lights, Camera, Arrest: The Stage is Set for a Federal Resolution of
a Citizen's Right to Record the Police in Public, 23 B.U. PUB. NT. L.J. 117, 131-48 (2014)
(discussing these open questions); Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Comment, Walking a Thin Blue Line:
Balancing the Citizen's Right to Record Police Officers Against Officer Privacy, 2013 BYU L. REv.
183, 189-94.
273. For an extended discussion along these lines, see Simonson, supra note 21.
274. See, e.g., Baradaran, supra note 136, at 1 (advocating for "a major shift in Fourth
Amendment balancing toward considering broader statistical data and facts to inform decisions and
educate courts to consider not only the defendant before them but the rights of society implicated in
every case"); Bowers & Robinson, supra note 40, at 265-68 (suggesting ways in which the Court
might consider lay perceptions of police practices in determining the constitutionality of those
practices).
275. See, e.g., Bacigal, supra note 132, at 92 ("Once the Court adopts a constitutional standard
that focuses on whether a person feels free to leave, that person should be taken as he or she is, not as
the Court visualizes some hypothetical person."); Carbado, supra note 40, at 970 (recommending a
conception of the Fourth Amendment "more concerned with the coercive and disciplinary ways in
which race structures the interaction between police officers and nonwhite persons"); Harris, supra
note 157, at 660-61 (arguing that a high crime area should not be an allowable factor to contribute to a
stop); Maclin, supra note 160, at 1328 (arguing that courts should consider freedom of movement in
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intend to substitute their own individual views for those of all of society; but
without access to information about society's views of particular practices, they
are left with their own impressions of what society considers reasonable.
27 6
Copwatching and its related activities provide data points and perspectives that
courts can use in determining what is reasonable in a particular neighborhood.
The presence of copwatchers in a courtroom or the admission of a video taken
by copwatchers into evidence gives a judge room to consider, for instance, the
harm of particular practices on communities, the dignity interests at stake in a
particular police action, and the neighborhood sentiment toward a particular
27practice. While those factors do not solve a Fourth Amendment question on
their own, they lend credence to efforts by scholars and courts to bring the
concept of the "reasonable" closer to the reality of life on the streets and roads
of America.
C. Redefining Community Policing
As currently defined and practiced, "community policing" happens on the
terms of the elite. Police departments and other state actors decide which
community residents to consult, when and where to consult them, and the goals
of those consultations. 278 At the same time, scholars and policy makers debate
and decide the best ways to structure meetings and build partnerships. 279 But it
does not have to be this way. The idea of "community policing"-of a method
of policing that is responsive to the residents of the area that is policed-need
not be elite driven. To the contrary, the concept of community policing should
make room for and even prioritize reform processes that are generated by
nonelites, by those traditionally outside of the system.280 This kind of police
reform, of which copwatching is a vibrant example, has largely been written
out of scholarly discussions of community policing. Taking copwatching and
other community-generated methods of accountability seriously provides a
richer way of thinking about the meaning of police accountability to
communities. Community policing should go beyond seeking input and
building partnerships; it should mean respecting processes of accountability
that originate outside of the system itself.
Fourth Amendment determinations); Thompson, supra note 25, at 1004-13 (arguing that courts should
consider the role of race in police officer decisions).
276. See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 40, at 223 (describing how, when the Court
determines "reasonableness" in the context of criminal procedure, "the Court has done almost no work
to determine whether its conceptions of the reasonable layperson dovetail with what people actually
find fair in a given context").
277. See supra notes 156-89 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 41-57 and accompanying text.
280. Cf BIBAS, supra note 32, at 29-48 (contrasting "insiders" and "outsiders" in the criminal
justice system).
2016]
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
The last two years have seen taskforces formed at national, state, and local
levels that seek to address the problems of community-police relations that
have surfaced in the wake of the events in Ferguson, Staten Island, and across
the nation. 28 The federal Task Force on 21st Century Policing has a goal of
examining "how to foster strong, collaborative relationships between local law
enforcement and the communities they protect" 282 -a goal that cannot be met
with consensus-based solutions alone. Instead, scholars and policy makers alike
should recognize that outside movements for social change and political
inclusion--even ones that seem to advocate an adversarial stance against local
police departments-are part of the larger world of local police accountability,
and should be part of what we mean when we talk about "community
policing."
CONCLUSION
Deciding how to involve the public in criminal justice institutions
depends on why you think involving the public matters. Popular engagement
with policing should be related not just to internal police department policies
and practices but also to larger webs of politics, power, and inequality. To treat
the two separate and apart from each other-to seek only collaboration, at the
expense of dissent-is to miss out on an important piece of the puzzle that is
police accountability.
My goal in this Article has not been to prove that adversarial methods of
participation like copwatching are normatively better than consensus-driven
efforts but rather to put organized copwatching on the map as a form of public
participation in policing worth taking seriously and studying in more detail.
Although community policing and other consensus-based reforms are
promising, adversarialism has its place. Indeed, it is through their stance as
critical observers rather than partners of police officers that copwatchers
provoke a broader debate about the function of local policing in neighborhoods
with profound social and political inequalities. Once we recognize the
importance of protecting some adversarial forms of police accountability that
originate outside of the elite-driven system, we can turn to looking for
combinations of accountability mechanisms-both consensus-based and
adversarial, both state-driven and civilian-driven-that together have the
potential to move local policing to a democratically accountable place.
281. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 44; STL
POSmvE CHANGE: THE FERGUSON COMMISSION, http://www.stlpositivechange.org
[https://perma.cc/EQ5R-9GXA] ("[The charge of the Ferguson Conmission is to] chart[] a new path
toward healing and positive change for the residents of the St. Louis region."); Jonathan Starkey,
Wilmington Crime Commission Clears Delaware House, NEWS JOURNAL (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2015/01/27/witmington-crime-commission-clears-
delaware-house/22435053/ [https://perma.ccYQ95-DZAU].
282. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 44, at 5.
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APPENDIX A
Copwatching Organizations That Participated in Telephone Interviews
Organization
Berkeley Copwatch
Communities United Against Police Brutality
(Minneapolis, MN)
Copwatch LA - South Central Chapter
Copwatch of East Atlanta
Georgia Cop Block
Justice Committee NYC
Los Angeles Community Action Network
Malcolm X Grassroots Movement (MXGM),
Brooklyn Chapter
Oct. 22 Coalition to Prevent Police Brutality
(Albuquerque, NM)
Peace House DC (Washington, DC)
Peaceful Streets Project Austin
Peaceful Streets Project New York
People's Justice (New York City)
Portland Copwatch
Redwood Curtain Copwatch (Humboldt County, CA)
Stop LA Spying Coalition
Tuscon Arizona Copblock
Virginia Copblock (Richmond, VA)
Year began
copwatching
1990
2000
2005
2010
2012
2007
2005
1999
2013
1999
2012
2012
2006
1992
2007
2011
2014
2011
2016]
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